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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 In the United States now there is a gap between what the public 
expects of its President and how the courts treat executive officers. 
Presidents, of course, like to declare that elections are about “values,” 
and one supposes they would not keep saying so unless a fair portion 
of the electorate agreed. Even legal academics increasingly say that 
the executive may be the best place for protecting certain constitu-
tional values, like federalism, or more generally for representing na-
tional norms of justice above the more parochial concerns of con-
gressmen.1  
                                                                                                                      
 * A.B. Harvard, J.D. Columbia. Appellate attorney, U.S. Department of Justice. I 
am grateful for the many helpful comments and suggestions I have received from readers, 
including John Bronsteen, Mike Dorf, Brandon Garrett, Robert Katzmann, Carlton Larson, 
Tom Merrill, Bernadette Meyler, Trevor Morrison, Michael Stokes Paulsen, Susan Sturm, 
Mark Tushnet and Robert Weisberg. Of course, any errors are mine, and the views here 
are mine alone and not those of the United States or of the Justice Department. 
 1. See Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2027, 2149-50 (2002); Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should 
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 Unsurprisingly, then, we now see that executive constitutional in-
terpretation, and executive ideals, of justice are at the center of diffi-
cult controversies. The Department of Defense is deciding what proc-
ess is due for alleged enemy combatants.2 The Environmental Protec-
tion Agency is deciding whether federal regulation of certain water-
ways would infringe on state land-use prerogatives.3 The Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) uses the Constitution as a baseline for decid-
ing when nonprofit entities are acting against “public policy,”4 as 
some argue they do when they engage in lobbying activities.5 The 
Drug Enforcement Agency has attempted to define “appropriate” 
medical care to exclude physician-assisted suicide.6  And nearly every 
agency prohibits those who receive agency funds from carrying out 
policies that have a disparate impact on racial minorities, despite the 
fact that the Supreme Court has said that such policies do not violate 
the Constitution.7 
 Courts seem confused about how to review these executive deci-
sions, or indeed whether to permit them at all.8 The confusion results 
from a collision between two trains of Supreme Court thought. From 
one direction, there is the legal realist view that assigning legal 
                                                                                                                      
Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985), reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
ANTHOLOGY 20, 26 (Thomas O. Sargentich ed., 1994); John O. McGinnis, Presidential Re-
view as Constitutional Restoration, 51 DUKE L.J. 901, 903-04, 926, 928-29 (2001). 
 2. John Mintz, U.S. Outlines Plan for Detainee Review, WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 2004, at 
A10. 
 3. See, e.g., National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System—Proposed Regula-
tions to Establish Requirements for Cooling Water Intake Structures at Phase III Facili-
ties, 69 Fed. Reg. 68,444, 68,454 (Envtl. Prot. Agency Nov. 24, 2004) (giving individual 
field offices authority to determine whether regulated waterway is within constitutional 
reach of the EPA’s Clean Water Act jurisdiction); Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
on the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 68 Fed. 
Reg. 1991 (Envtl. Prot. Agency Jan. 15, 2003); cf. Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 
43,255 (Aug. 4, 1999) (directing federal agencies to take “action limiting the policymaking 
discretion of the [s]tates [through preemptive regulatory action] only where . . . the na-
tional activity is appropriate in light of the presence of a problem of national significance”). 
 4. See David A. Brennen, Charities and the Constitution: Evaluating the Role of Con-
stitutional Principles in Determining the Scope of Tax Law’s Public Policy Limitation for 
Charities, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 779, 786-87 (2002). 
 5. See, e.g., Craig Holman, The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act: Limits and Oppor-
tunities for Non-Profit Groups in Federal Elections, 31 N. KY. L. REV. 243, 280-82 (2004); 
Craig Holman & Joan Claybrook, Outside Groups in the New Campaign Finance Environ-
ment: The Meaning of BCRA and the McConnell Decision, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 235, 
245-54 (2004); see also Fred Stokeld, Group Complains to IRS About Falwell’s Fund-
Raising Letter, 28 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 464, 464 (2000). 
 6. Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118, 1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 2004), aff’d, 126 S. Ct. 904 
(2006). 
 7. See Bradford C. Mank, Are Title VI’s Disparate Impact Regulations Valid?, 71 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 517, 518-19 (2002). 
 8. See, e.g., Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 661-63 (9th Cir. 1997) (analyzing the 
“complex question” of how courts should review agency decisions that may also implicate 
constitutional considerations). 
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meaning is a choice of policy.9 That view has been the dominant 
paradigm in the judicial review of agency statutory interpretation 
since the Court’s 1984 opinion in Chevron, U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc., where the Court determined that it 
must defer to “reasonable” agency choices on the presumption that 
agencies have superior technical expertise, better information, and a 
more direct connection to popular policy preferences.10 In this view, 
statutory texts have no single, fixed meaning; the best interpretation 
changes over time according to new facts and new politics.11  
 Yet from the other direction there are the Court’s opinions in City 
of Boerne v. Flores and similar decisions, which suggest that Con-
gress cannot redefine a constitutional provision that has already 
been interpreted by the Court.12 These cases seem to propose the op-
posite view of interpretation when it arises in the constitutional con-
text: Political choices are suspect, and the Court’s chosen interpreta-
tion of the constitutional text is the “right meaing,” to be second-
guessed, if at all, only by the Court.13 While congressional efforts to 
remedy or prevent constitutional violations are legitimate, even 
those may be struck down if under the guise of enforcement they at-
tempt to change the Court’s chosen definition.14 Some commentators 
have labeled this view as “judicial exclusivity,” because, in essence, 
only the Court is permitted to interpret the Constitution.15  
 This Article discusses the threshold question of whether a review-
ing court can permit any independent executive interpretation of the 
Constitution—that is, irrespective of any deterrence, whether an 
agency even has the authority to take a view of the Constitution dif-
                                                                                                                      
 9. See Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the 
Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1394-98 (1996) (describing the real-
ist movement). 
 10. 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984); see 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
TREATISE § 2.6, at 100-01 (4th ed. 2002); John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and 
Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 621-
27 (1996). Some accounts put the rise of realism much earlier—for example, with the 
Court’s decision in Erie Railroad. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), that each state is 
entitled to develop its own common law free of federal control, or with the development of 
administrative law during the middle of the last century. See Michael C. Dorf, Foreword: 
The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 47-48 (1998); Louis L. Jaffe, Ju-
dicial Review: Question of Law, 69 HARV. L. REV. 239, 263 (1955). 
 11. See Dorf, supra note 10, at 47; Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Leg-
islative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281, 309-17 (1989). 
 12. 521 U.S. 507, 519-20 (1997); see Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 
356, 365 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 80-83 (2000); see also Henry P. 
Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 32-33 (1983) (not-
ing tension between constitutional and nonconstitutional review of administrative action). 
 13. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidis-
crimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 525 (2000). 
 14. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519, 530. 
 15. Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability, 84 VA. 
L. REV. 83, 86 (1998). 
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ferent from the courts. Although doctrine is unresolved, it would 
seem as though there is at least a strong inference that the principles 
of Boerne must apply as much to agencies as to Congress—otherwise 
Congress could evade Boerne simply by delegating to an agency the 
power that the Court forbids Congress to exercise. Additionally, 
courts traditionally will read the scope of delegated authority nar-
rowly to avoid a serious question about the constitutionality of an ex-
ecutive decision.16 To the extent that the applicability of Boerne to 
agencies is in doubt, courts may simply presume that Congress does 
not intend to give agencies authority that might arguably approach 
the limits of its own power.  
 Although formally Boerne and its progeny address only the scope 
of Congress’s power to “enforce” the Fourteenth Amendment, the un-
derlying rationale for judicial exclusivity may extend much farther. 
The Boerne question overlaps significantly with a heated scholarly 
dispute about the interpretive independence of each of the three 
branches of government. The dominant view, called “departmenta-
lism” in some quarters, holds that judicial interpretations of the Con-
stitution are binding only within the scope of a particular case or 
controversy before a court.17 For example, the departmentalist might 
say that although the Supreme Court has defined what sorts of po-
litical activities by certain nonprofit entities cannot be regulated by 
the government, the IRS might voluntarily take a broader reading of 
the First Amendment in exempting a wider class from regulation. 
The few academic opponents of departmentalism claim in contrast 
that the Constitution means, in essence, only what a court says it 
means.18 The Boerne rule might be framed as a logical corollary of 
that view: the other branches can apply and enforce the Constitution 
                                                                                                                      
 16. See Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172-73 (2001); 
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 190-91 (1991). 
 17. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 106-08, 144 (2004); Devins & Fisher, supra note 15, at 88, 91, 96; Dawn 
E. Johnsen, Functional Departmentalism and Nonjudicial Interpretation: Who Determines 
Constitutional Meaning?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2004, at 105-06; Gary Lawson 
& Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. 
REV. 1267, 1269-70 (1996); Frank I. Michelman, Living with Judicial Supremacy, 38 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 579, 597-602 (2003); Bruce G. Peabody, Nonjudicial Constitutional Inter-
pretation, Authoritative Settlement, and a New Agenda for Research, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 
63, 63-65 & n.2 (1999). Michael Stokes Paulsen goes one step farther, arguing that the ex-
ecutive is sometimes not bound even by court judgments against it. Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. 
L.J. 217, 264 (1994). 
 18. See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Defending Judicial Supremacy: A Re-
ply, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 455, 455 (2000) [hereinafter Alexander & Schauer, Defending 
Supremacy]; Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1387 (1997) [hereinafter Alexander & Schauer, Extra-
judicial Interpretation]; Burt Neuborne, The Binding Quality of Supreme Court Precedent, 
61 TUL. L. REV. 991, 993, 998-99 (1987). 
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as the judiciary has interpreted it, but they have no authority to act 
based on any constitutional interpretation other than that of the ju-
diciary.  
 The academic literature, though, has not yet considered the sig-
nificance of departmentalism as a rule of administrative law. That is, 
while commentators have explored whether departmentalism is an 
attractive theory for Congress and the President, they have not ad-
dressed whether it meets the institutional needs of the Court. For in-
stance, one common argument against judicial exclusivity is that 
sometimes courts will act immorally, so there must be an option of 
public disobedience.19 But we can hardly expect courts to design doc-
trine based upon that claim. And much of the existing analysis fo-
cuses on vetoes, pardons, and prosecutorial discretion—areas where 
judicial review is impossible, so judicial response is largely irrele-
vant.  
 Another significant gap in the existing literature is its apparent 
assumption that judicial exclusivity is an either-or proposition. On 
one side, judges must have exclusive power to interpret the Constitu-
tion, because the judiciary is in the best position to save us from 
wasteful and irreconcilable arguments about conflicting interpreta-
tions.20 On the other side, judges have no realm exclusive to them-
selves, because constitutional law is policy, and because the benefits 
of experiment, superior information, and more complete accountabil-
ity apply to constitutional and statutory law alike.21 While the rule of 
Boerne may have many vices, it is more nuanced than the prevailing 
bipolar treatment suggests. The Court says that it prohibits “sub-
stantive change” of the Constitution but permits its “enforcement.”22 
As others have pointed out, this structure permits a fair amount of 
what is probably in reality constitutional interpretation by Con-
gress.23 Yet there has been no thorough consideration whether this 
hybrid regime, which I call “partial exclusivity,” can peacefully coex-
ist with either competing camp.24 
                                                                                                                      
 19. See infra text accompanying notes 105-06. 
 20. See Alexander & Schauer, Extrajudicial Interpretation, supra note 18, at 1360-62, 
1371-81. 
 21. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and 
Judicial Supremacy, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1027, 1034-37 (2004). As I will explain, we should be 
careful not to confuse this position with lawlessness or executive supremacy. Those who 
are opposed to judicial exclusivity are not necessarily opposed to judicial review, in which 
the Supreme Court may be “supreme” in the sense that its views about what the law 
means in a given case are binding on the other branches of government and other litigants. 
See infra text accompanying notes 43-51. 
 22. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518-20 (1997). 
 23. See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 857, 885 (1999). 
 24. Recently, Professor Alexander, writing with Lawrence Solum, appeared to argue 
that exclusivity might apply to some constitutional “rules” but not to some constitutional 
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 This Article tries to fill those theoretical lacunae. Using Boerne as 
a starting point, I ask what rule of administrative law courts would 
likely adopt if they were motivated by the concerns that produced the 
Boerne opinion. How should courts respond when an agency claims 
that its policy choice is justified by the agency’s understanding of the 
Constitution, where that understanding departs from what courts 
have said the Constitution means? Should courts read all delegations 
narrowly to exclude executive constitutional interpretations? If not, 
might there be at least some situations where courts should appro-
priately reject executive interpretations, even if they might be in-
clined to agree if they reached the merits? Or should there be no lim-
its at all on these “independent” executive interpretations?  
 Although it is focused on the underpinnings of Boerne, this Article 
is only modestly descriptive. I confess here at the outset that my aim 
is to fit a theory of collaborative interpretation into the prevailing 
doctrine, which is nominally exclusivist. Thus, I engage Boerne and 
its possible justifications critically as a springboard for examining 
the institutional considerations that might, from the judiciary’s per-
spective, justify either complete or partial judicial exclusivity vis-à-
vis the executive.  
 I conclude that although a blanket presumption against inde-
pendent executive interpretation is hard to defend, there is a fairly 
strong argument for partial exclusivity—a rule that would prohibit 
agencies from utilizing their own constitutional interpretations in 
some circumstances, but not in others. I readily concede the argu-
ments of proponents of collaborative interpretation. Indeed, I am one 
of them. The utility of partial exclusivity is that it carves out some 
small portion of constitutional law beyond the reach of politics, but 
allows for collaboration and experimentation with the remainder, 
which may in turn benefit the judiciary’s solitary elaboration of the 
apolitical core. I also agree that the formalist distinction between 
statutory and constitutional law is incoherent, and that any efforts to 
disarm popular resistance to countermajoritarian decisions based 
upon claims that the Court is uniquely “right” in the field of constitu-
tional law are ultimately bound to fail. Further, as I explain, I am 
skeptical of the assertions made by Boerne’s academic defenders that 
exclusivity settles the law in a way that could not be replicated by 
ordinary judicial review using doctrines that encourage a high degree 
of administrative rigidity. I also doubt that settlement is so impor-
tant that it should prevail over the values of collaboration.  
                                                                                                                      
“standards.” Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 1594, 1632-34 (2005) (reviewing KRAMER, supra note 17). Alexander and 
Solum do not explore whether their revised exclusivity can coexist with the rationale of 
Alexander and Schauer’s seemingly more comprehensive views. I attempt that here. 
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 Nevertheless, I argue for partial exclusivity, rather than complete 
freedom of executive interpretation, because some of the possible ex-
planations for Boerne are surprisingly durable when employed spar-
ingly. For example, by helping to reinforce the judicial self-image, ex-
clusivity may at times promote principled behavior both by judges 
and those they review. If nothing else, exclusivity gives courts an 
empty platform from which to stage a pageant of moral leadership on 
divisive issues. 
 In the ensuing parts, I develop these themes and the debates that 
surround them in greater detail. Part II explains the existing state of 
the law on how courts should respond to executive claims of author-
ity to interpret the Constitution, and situates that law in a larger de-
bate about whether judges should be the exclusive interpreters of the 
Constitution. Part III moves on to the only really comprehensive de-
fense of judicial exclusivity, which is the claim that judges alone are 
capable of settling the law so that it is more predictable and less 
wasteful. After assessing the arguments in favor of settlement as a 
premiere value, and finding them rather unconvincing, Part IV nev-
ertheless assumes that even if settlement is our highest value and 
judges the best defenders of it, we would probably be content with 
judicial review instead of exclusivity. Part IV examines an alterna-
tive claim based upon the unique competence of judges—that keeping 
constitutional interpretation solely within the judiciary will further 
protection for rights conceived as “public goods” or “second-order 
preferences” (that is, as things we should all want but selfishly fail to 
preserve). Part IV finds, however, that exclusivity overextends judges 
and needlessly gives up better means for identifying and preserving 
these kinds of preferences. Part V posits that exclusivity might be an 
indispensable tool of judicial rhetoric. Part V first rejects the idea 
that exclusivity can be a useful component of Bickelian claims that 
judicial opinions reach “right” answers and so have unique moral 
claims on the public. It goes on to propose that rhetoric is part of the 
judiciary’s efforts to define itself in contrast to the “unprincipled” 
world of politics, and thereby reinforces the judicial self-image as a 
principled defender of rights. The Part concludes by observing that, 
under this rationale, universal exclusivity would appear to be unnec-
essary. Part VI takes up that possibility, exploring whether only par-
tial exclusivity is intellectually coherent, how it would affect other 
possible judicial goals, and how it relates to the Boerne rule. Part VII 
returns more directly to the doctrinal question that we began with, 
arguing that agencies might actually be less constrained in their con-
stitutional interpretations than Congress. In Part VIII, I synthesize 
the various arguments for and against exclusivity to formulate a 
plausible test for when exclusivity ought to be invoked against execu-
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tive interpretations. I then give a pair of examples demonstrating 
how the test might work in practice. Part IX concludes.  
II.   SOME BACKGROUND ON THE BACKGROUND RULES 
 This Part sketches the prevailing wisdom about an agency’s au-
thority to make decisions based upon constitutional reasoning. Be-
cause doctrine says little directly about the subject, my sketch swiftly 
expands into a more general picture of how a court ought to respond 
to executive claims to independent constitutional interpretative au-
thority. In the last decade, the Supreme Court has asserted that it 
alone is the nation’s authoritative interpreter of the Constitution, 
which obviously implies a chilly reception for agencies who think 
otherwise. But, as surveyed very briefly here, there are scarcely any 
commentators who find merit in the Court’s position. Two of those 
who have dared most prominently to defend it have also been re-
ceived frostily.  
 I begin with the scant doctrine. A handful of lower court decisions 
have suggested that agencies lack power to consider the Constitution 
independent of a court’s views.25 Yet others claim, perhaps contradic-
torily, that agencies can defy the clear mandate of statutory language 
in order to avoid violating the Constitution.26 But the opinions in this 
second camp are ambiguous about whether the power they describe 
arises only to avoid constitutional questions a court has already iden-
tified, or if an agency can ignore Congress based on its own view of 
the Constitution. As a result, they offer little guidance about the 
power of an agency independently to interpret the Constitution. 
 Structural inferences from broader administrative law are not 
much clearer. Federal courts usually defer to federal agencies on 
questions of statutory interpretation.27 Contemporary interpretative 
doctrine recognizes that the choice of a statute’s meaning within the 
range of lexical possibilities created by the text is a policy decision, a 
                                                                                                                      
 25. Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 662 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that courts should 
not defer to agency constitutional interpretations because agencies usually have no author-
ity to issue them and, in any event, are not expert at them); Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Lehman, 
842 F.2d 1102, 1122-26 (9th Cir. 1988), withdrawn, 893 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1989); Plato v. 
Roudebush, 397 F. Supp. 1295, 1305-06 (D. Md. 1975); see also Johnson v. Robison, 415 
U.S. 361, 368 (1974) (noting that agencies generally do not have jurisdiction to consider 
constitutional challenges to statutes); Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. 524, 
545-47, 612-13 (1838) (stating in dicta that the President does not have power to order his 
officers to disobey Congress). 
 26. See Marozsan v. United States, 852 F.2d 1469, 1492 & n.4 (7th Cir. 1988) (en 
banc) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting); cf. Cont’l Air Lines, Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 843 F.2d 
1444, 1455-56 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that an agency has authority to construe a statute 
in light of constitutional concerns, even though it cannot pass on the constitutionality of 
the statute itself).  
 27. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227-28 (2001). 
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choice of the “best” reading of the statute.28 Because an agency’s ca-
pacity for gathering information about a problem, for accumulating 
technical expertise, and for sensitivity to public norms about the 
most desirable resolution are all (mostly) superior to the comparable 
capacity of federal courts, the Court allows the agency to choose the 
“best” meaning, absent some strong indication that the agency has 
acted contrary to congressional intent.29 That is the core of the Chev-
ron doctrine—the rule that a court must defer to the reasonable 
views of an agency authorized by Congress to interpret an ambiguity 
in a particular statute.30 Of course, Chevron depends on the assump-
tion that an agency has actually exercised its capabilities. Thus, 
courts can also review the process of agency decisionmaking to en-
sure that it is relatively transparent, democratic, and deliberative, 
or, in the doctrinal formula, not “arbitrary and capricious.”31  
 These two principles, which form the bedrock of modern adminis-
trative law, seem to translate poorly to the realm of constitutional in-
terpretation. The Supreme Court, especially over the last decade, has 
resisted the claim that interpretations of constitutional text, like 
readings of statutory text, are political decisions. Most prominently, 
in City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court reacted almost with disdain to 
the possibility that constitutional decisions could be reduced to the 
status of “ordinary” politics.32 Thus, it held that Congress’s power 
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to “enforce” the Four-
teenth Amendment gave Congress authority only to enact norms de-
rived directly from the Court’s own understanding of the Constitu-
tion’s meaning.33 Congress could try to remedy or prevent constitu-
tional injuries, but only after it demonstrated that the injuries its 
legislation targeted were harms that the Court itself would consider 
breaches of the Constitution.34 In effect, Boerne announced a rule of 
“judicial exclusivity”; only courts can decide what the Constitution 
means, no matter how popular, deliberative, or informed Congress’s 
choices might be.35  
 The question for this Article is to what extent the rationale of 
Boerne extends to agency interpretations of the Constitution. Can an 
                                                                                                                      
 28. See Rubin, supra note 9, at 1394-98, 1401. 
 29. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002); 1 PIERCE, supra note 10, § 2.6, at 
97-98. 
 30. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 
(1984); see Mead, 535 U.S. at 229-31. 
 31. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43-44 
(1983); 1 PIERCE, supra note 10, § 7.1, at 413.  
 32. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529 (1997). 
 33. Id. at 519-20. 
 34. Id. at 519, 532; see also United States v. Georgia, 126 S. Ct. 877, 880-82 (2006); 
Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001). 
 35. Devins & Fisher, supra note 15, at 93. 
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agency, citing its own independent view of the First Amendment, in 
effect reenact the Religious Freedom Restoration Act struck down by 
the Court in Boerne by obliging states doing business with it to avoid 
undue burdens on religious exercise? Can it curtail its own enforce-
ment of a statute it superintends by explaining that, although the 
Court’s precedents allow such enforcement, the agency believes it 
would be unconstitutional?  
 Strictly doctrinal reasoning might suggest not. If the Court’s in-
tent is to curtail Congress, it hardly seems likely to let an agency 
reach the same result after Congress delegates, with a wink and 
nudge, power to do it. The “arbitrary and capricious” standard could 
be a formal tool for articulating that line of reasoning. Convention-
ally, an agency acts arbitrarily when it bases its decision on a factor 
Congress did not want it to consider.36 We might similarly say that a 
factor that Congress could not have itself considered cannot be 
passed along to the agency for the agency’s use.  
 Of course, nominally Boerne’s doctrinal reach is very narrow: it 
constrains only Congress’s efforts to use Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. But its rhetorical claims seem very large. Suppose, for 
example, that a court was in the rare position of deciding whether 
Congress’s reason for enacting a statute is a legitimate purpose—for 
instance, when deciding whether a statute can withstand First 
Amendment scrutiny. Can a statute survive constitutional balancing 
when Congress asserts that the justification for the statute is to pro-
tect another constitutional right, and that other right as defined by 
Congress differs from the Court’s prior interpretations? If we take 
the rhetoric of Boerne at face value, then perhaps not; only the Court 
can define rights, and therefore Congress can have little interest in 
preserving a “right” that in the Court’s view does not exist.  
 Turning back to agencies, it is apparent that we need to under-
stand more about Boerne before we can answer our questions. Courts 
review the reasons agencies give for their decisions in almost every 
case—either directly, or indirectly, in the form of an assumption that 
the agency’s decision is entitled to deference. Does Boerne stand for 
the proposition that the political branches can never rest their deci-
sions on constitutional deliberation, unless that deliberation takes 
the Constitution to mean strictly what the Court has said?  
 It is important to recognize that as long as this question is open, it 
not only raises doubts about the legitimacy of many agency decisions, 
but also in many cases actually forecloses them. That is because 
courts also presume that Congress, absent clear statutory authoriza-
tion, does not intend to delegate to an agency power that would skirt 
                                                                                                                      
 36. See 1 PIERCE, supra note 10, § 7.4, at 452. 
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the edges of the authority the Constitution permits.37 This is an as-
pect of “constitutional avoidance”—the principle that courts should 
deflect unresolved constitutional questions rather than answer 
them.38 The effect is usually to give stronger protection to the under-
lying constitutional right without exhausting as much of the Court’s 
political capital as might be expended in an outright constitutional 
holding.39 For example, as Professor Bickel once observed, in presum-
ing that agencies cannot exercise any power that might approach a 
constitutional limit, a court forces the agency to return to Congress 
for unmistakable statutory authorization—a process that is both 
time-consuming and difficult and that also arguably makes Con-
gress’s decision to challenge the Court more visible to the public.40 
Thus courts might, in the name of avoiding a Boerne-type question, 
prevent agencies from using any independent constitutional judg-
ment (unless Congress clearly requires it). 
 The avoidance rationale suggests that this reasoning might well 
be backward. If avoidance is supposed to afford greater protection of 
rights, then it might be perverse to make it harder for an agency to 
give a more expansive interpretation of a constitutional right than 
the Court, burdened by doubts about its policymaking competency 
and democratic pedigree, is willing to declare. This is the essence of 
the argument offered by critics of the Boerne rule. Courts, these crit-
ics say, should cooperate with the political branches, nurturing rights 
interpretation where it sprouts outside the courthouse walls and 
drawing on the expertise and popular insight of the other two 
branches in making the judiciary’s own interpretations better.41 
Other commentators broaden this approach beyond the government 
entirely, arguing that since “the people themselves” are the ultimate 
arbiters of constitutional meaning, we should trust that an informed 
                                                                                                                      
 37. See Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172-73 (2001); 
1 PIERCE, supra note 10, § 2.6, at 93. Despite this presumption, the Court sometimes is 
forced to confront the constitutionality of a delegation, as where it is clear that Congress 
intended to authorize an agency to approach the constitutional limits of its authority. See, 
e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 846-47 (1986). 
 38. Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 82-83; Adrian 
Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1949 (1997). 
 39. See Alexander M. Bickel & Harry H. Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Ju-
dicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1, 27-28 (1957); Richard A. Posner, 
Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 
816 (1983). 
 40. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 156-69 (2d ed. 1986); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Is the 
Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?, 98 MICH. L. REV. 303, 358-59 (1999). 
 41. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE 
SUPREME COURT 24-27 (1999); Dorf, supra note 10, at 69-73; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Fore-
word: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 150-51 (1997); Post & Siegel, 
supra note 13, at 516-19. 
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populace can offer the check on unjust political interpretations of the 
Constitution that courts now claim to provide.42 
 The applicability of Boerne to agency decisions also intersects an-
other, related, academic debate about the Supreme Court’s “suprem-
acy.” Scholars have wrestled with the extent to which the Court’s in-
terpretations of the Constitution should bind other branches of gov-
ernment. Although terminology is often muddled, there is wide-
spread agreement about most points. There are three basic flavors of 
supremacy. The first two form the core of what we traditionally think 
of as the power of judicial review. In the first, which we might call 
Merryman supremacy, the other branches are bound to follow the 
holding of a case in which they participate as a party.43 With the ex-
ception of Professor Paulsen, and possibly Dean Kramer, no one has 
seriously argued that a coordinate branch can disregard a judgment 
entered against it.44 The second flavor we might call Klein suprem-
acy; it would hold that Congress and the Executive cannot order 
courts to give up a judicial interpretation of the Constitution in favor 
of the view of one of the coordinate branches.45 The critical feature of 
Klein supremacy is that its focus is on what courts do.  While politi-
cal actors cannot direct a constitutional rule of decision for a court, 
Klein supremacy says nothing directly about what the Constitution 
means for nonjudicial actors not subject to judicial review. This, too, 
is generally uncontroversial; it is the variety of supremacy at stake in 
Professor Monaghan’s seminal work on “constitutional common 
law.”46 As Monaghan describes it, a court can draw lines separating 
constitutional holdings, which cannot be “overturned” legislatively, 
from constitutional common law, a regime under which the court’s 
view can be superseded by statute or regulation.47  
                                                                                                                      
 42. KRAMER, supra note 17, at 247-48; Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against 
Judicial Review, 3 (Mar. 16, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.ucl.ac.uk/spp/ 
download/seminars/0405/Waldron-Judicial.pdf; see MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE 
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 30-32, 177-94 (1999); see also Alexander & Solum, 
supra note 24, at 1623-24 (explicating, but disagreeing with, KRAMER, supra note 17). 
 43. Johnsen, supra note 17, at 108; see Alexander & Solum, supra note 24, at 1608. 
Professor Paulsen describes what he hypothesizes as the President’s power to defy judg-
ments as “Merryman Power,” after the clash between Lincoln and the Supreme Court over 
Lincoln’s suspension of the writ of habeas corpus at the outset of the Civil War. See Paul-
sen, supra note 17, at 277-84.  
 44. See KRAMER, supra note 17, at 201; Alexander & Solum, supra note 24, at 1614; 
Paulsen, supra note 17, at 277; see also Post & Siegel, supra note 21, at 1033-34 (interpret-
ing Kramer’s claims). 
 45. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 146 (1871); see Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 
Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218-19 (1995); see also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703-04 
(1974) (rejecting the President’s claim that his interpretation of executive privilege should 
bind the Court). 
 46. Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 
3 (1975). 
 47. Id. at 23-30. 
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 The third flavor, and the marginally more controversial one, asks 
whether nonjudicial actors must treat the Constitution as though it 
means only what courts have understood it to mean, even if the con-
stitutional question arises in a context very unlikely ever to reach a 
court. The dominant contemporary view, generally called “depart-
mentalism,” holds that they do not.48 For example, departmentalists 
claim that when the President pardons an individual on the theory 
that the statute criminalizing her conduct is unconstitutional, the 
President may apply his own independent understanding of the Con-
stitution and not simply what a court has said (or, perhaps, would 
say).49 In a sense, Boerne is the inverse of departmentalism, in that 
Boerne seems to depend on an assumption that, at least for nonjudi-
cial constitutional decisions that later come before the Court for re-
view, valid “constitutional” interpretation can mean only interpreta-
tion that echoes what the Court itself has already said.50 Again, aca-
demic defections from the departmentalism camp are scarce. Most 
prominently, one lonely pair, Larry Alexander and Fred Schauer, ar-
gue that this third variety of supremacy—they call it “exclusivity”—
is normatively attractive because it produces many of the goods 
Monaghan claimed for Klein supremacy: stability, certainty, and 
“settlement”—the opportunity for the Court to take “off the table” 
disputes that society will only waste time and effort trying to solve 
for itself.51 Their view, though, is not widely shared.  
 This Article is about how courts should respond to the claims of 
departmentalism. Are those claims persuasive? Even if they are, can 
a court accept them and still go about its business? Or are the three 
supremacies in some respects interwoven, so that a court must claim 
supremacy in all three fields in order for any one of them, even the 
anti-Merryman power, ultimately to be effective? And is this last con-
cern so serious that courts should presume broadly that Congress 
does not intend to delegate departmentalist-type power, or is it a 
concern that can be addressed more effectively case by case? 
 Before moving on, it will be helpful to clarify two last points. The 
third variety of supremacy may prohibit independent constitutional 
interpretation, but it would seem not to affect agency efforts to pre-
dict what courts will say. That is, an agency might curtail enforce-
                                                                                                                      
 48. See supra note 17 and accompanying text; see also Alexander & Solum, supra note 
24, at 1612-13 (outlining the departmentalist view); Alexander & Schauer, Extrajudicial 
Interpretation, supra note 18, at 1359 (describing view they criticize as “a consensus . . . 
among scholars and officials”). 
 49. See Alexander & Solum, supra note 24, at 1629-30; Paulsen, supra note 17, at 264-
67. 
 50. See Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: 
The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 352-53 (1998) (describing “judicial 
supremacy”); Johnsen, supra note 17, at 119. 
 51. See Alexander & Schauer, Extrajudicial Interpretation, supra note 18, at 1371-81. 
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ment activities for constitutional reasons in two distinct ways. The 
first is because it wants to avoid invalidation by a court on constitu-
tional grounds. The other is because it concludes, based on its own 
reading of the Constitution, that its actions are unconstitutional and 
therefore are to be avoided. This is an important difference because 
the predictive model acknowledges judicial supremacy in constitu-
tional interpretation, while the second ignores or defies it. Thus, 
Boerne-type exclusivity should accept without much difficulty extra-
judicial constitutional interpretation that is only an extrapolation of 
what courts have done, engaged in for the purpose of avoiding judi-
cial invalidation. My focus in the rest of this Article accordingly sets 
aside that situation, which I view as an easy case, and concentrates 
instead on the issue of the permissibility of truly independent consti-
tutional reasoning by the Executive.  
 It is also worth emphasizing that I see a difference between re-
view for whether an interpretation is permissible and review for 
whether that interpretation is correct. Boerne, for example, seems to 
consist of two separate inquiries: first, whether the constitutional 
right recognized by Congress protects the same conduct safeguarded 
by judicial opinion—whether Congress is “right” about the law—and 
then to the extent that it deviates, whether it goes too far, or instead 
is sufficiently “congruent and proportional” with the underlying 
right.52 If we entirely rejected departmentalism, we would terminate 
the Boerne inquiry at the end of the first prong, once we had con-
cluded that Congress’s action could only be justified by an independ-
ent constitutional judgment. On the other hand, a very strong de-
partmentalist rule might avoid the need for the first step altogether; 
it would be enough that Congress’s judgment rested on its own view 
of the Constitution, and the Court would have no authority to second-
guess that determination. Thus, the question whether independent 
interpretation is permissible may avoid entirely the need to judge 
whether an interpretation is “right” in the court’s view.53 As Boerne 
shows, we then face an additional puzzle about how, or whether, to 
impose other limits on permissible nonjudicial interpretations. But 
that is an inquiry I leave for later work. What follows considers only 
whether agency interpretations of the Constitution may be valid ir-
respective of whether a court would say that they are “correct.”  
                                                                                                                      
 52. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 519-21 (2004). 
 53. For this reason, I disagree with the claim by Professors Alexander and Solum that 
departmentalism is ultimately pointless. They argue that in the end, all nonjudicial inter-
pretations can be brought before a court for examination on the merits, so that permitting 
initial independent interpretation accomplishes little. Alexander & Solum, supra note 24, 
at 1614-15. But that seems to presume their case; if courts are willing to tolerate “constitu-
tional” norms established by other political actors without demanding judicial review of the 
accuracy of the norm, then judicial control over the shape of the norm is not at all inevita-
ble.  
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III.   COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE, OR BOERNE EST 
MORT 
 As I suggested in the last Part, scholarly debate over extrajudicial 
constitutional interpretation now centers on the question of whether 
the judiciary is in some way uniquely capable of authoritative inter-
pretation. That is, if the main argument against departmentalism is 
“settlement,” the burden falls on critics of departmentalism to show 
that judges can provide settlement that politics cannot. And, natu-
rally, the critics also have to show that settlement matters. Indeed, 
the principle objection to Professors Alexander and Schauer is not 
that they are wrong in that courts are more adept at “settling” the 
law, but rather that it is often better to be accurate than to be final.54 
In the realm of purely statutory interpretation, it is generally agreed 
that the political branches are more likely to be “right” as a matter of 
policy.55 Schauer ripostes, however, that there are some issues we 
know we cannot trust the political branches to answer “correctly.”56  
 In this Part, I try, with all due respect to the current combating 
scholars, to refine the terms of their debate. Part III.A considers the 
running debate over whether the law’s settlement function is a logi-
cal choice as the highest value for our legal system to pursue, and if 
so, whether judges are best positioned to defend it. I conclude that al-
though it is probably correct that judges are likely to be better able to 
settle the law, the case for settlement as an overarching concern is 
tenuous, especially considering that we do not make the same claim 
for the interpretation of statutes. Part III.B, however, accepts both 
premises, but argues that we might still not agree that these prem-
ises entail judicial exclusivity rather than the more limited suprem-
acy entailed by judicial review. 
A.   Well, That Settles It. Right? 
 For Alexander and Schauer—at least when they are writing to-
gether—“settlement” is a premiere value.57 For them, the rule of law 
is all: Consistent and predictable constitutional rules make planning 
easier, and prevent wasteful efforts to alter its existing form or to 
                                                                                                                      
 54. See Devins & Fisher, supra note 15, at 103-04. 
 55. See Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 150-
51 (1991); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (cit-
ing Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 
4-5 (1980); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear 
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 630-31 (1992); Man-
ning, supra note 10, at 627. 
 56. Frederick Schauer, Judicial Supremacy and the Modest Constitution, 92 CAL. L. 
REV. 1045, 1055, 1064-66 (2004). 
 57. Alexander & Schauer, Defending Supremacy, supra note 18, at 473.  
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predict how a rule will develop.58 They argue against departmenta-
lism by discussing Professor Monaghan’s familiar point that society 
benefits from avoiding debate about contentious issues.59 And they 
suggest that these values outweigh any benefits that might inure to 
society from rules that were more adaptable and more open to out-
side input.60  
 This Part considers the arguments against settlement, starting 
with common points by critics and moving on to some thoughts of my 
own. On the whole I think settlement fares somewhat better than the 
current consensus suggests, although I do not think either side has a 
real knock down argument.  
1.   Empirical Challenges 
 The first problem with the settlement justification for judicial ex-
clusivity is basically a problem of fit. Although Alexander and 
Schauer rather weakly argue that their claim is really about what an 
ideal system should be,61 they do little to explain why, if their pro-
posal is consistent with our prevailing notion of how justice should 
function, our current system does not incorporate much of their posi-
tion.62 In fact, I think their defense on this ground could be more spir-
ited. For example, to critics who point out that seemingly definitive 
Supreme Court rulings on issues like abortion and affirmative action 
hardly seem to have eased societal disagreement,63 they might re-
spond that this disagreement only illustrates their point. Much of the 
ongoing debate seems to involve efforts to affect future Supreme 
Court decisions, by selecting Justices with different points of view.64 
                                                                                                                      
 58. Id. at 482; Alexander & Schauer, Extrajudicial Interpretation, supra note 18, at 
1371-81. 
 59. Alexander & Schauer, Defending Supremacy, supra note 18, at 467, 469-70; Alex-
ander & Schauer, Extrajudicial Interpretation, supra note 18, at 1380; see Henry Paul 
Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 750-51 
(1988). 
 60. Alexander & Schauer, Defending Supremacy, supra note 18, at 470, 475; Alexan-
der & Schauer, Extrajudicial Interpretation, supra note 18, at 1372-73.  
 61. Alexander & Schauer, Defending Supremacy, supra note 18, at 460-64. 
 62. See Paulsen, supra note 17, at 225; cf. Scott E. Gant, Judicial Supremacy and 
Nonjudicial Interpretation of the Constitution, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 359, 373 (1997) 
(“[O]ur current legal regime at times operates other than we would expect if judicial su-
premacy were an accurate descriptive account.”). Alexander and Schauer acknowledge this 
difficulty but addresses it only indirectly by arguing that their focus on institutional com-
petence adequately accounts for real-world considerations. See Alexander & Schauer, De-
fending Supremacy, supra note 18, at 465, 480. They do not, however, get around to ex-
plaining their “fit” problem.  
 63. See Devins & Fisher, supra note 15, at 84-85; Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial 
Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections and Responses, 80 N.C. L. REV. 773, 801 
(2002). 
 64. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP THE FEDERAL 
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS (1994); KRAMER, supra note 17, at 227-28; cf. Monaghan, supra 
note 59, at 750 (explaining that settlement may remove merits of a constitutional judg-
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In other words, maybe Supreme Court decisions are not really set-
tling issues the way Alexander and Schauer suggest because the de-
cisions now are not seen as being truly final.  
 Perhaps an even stronger sense of Supreme Court exclusivity and 
finality would cut off this debate as well. Suppose it was widely 
thought that, inasmuch as constitutional deliberation is the Court’s 
task alone, the views of future Justices on constitutional matters are 
not proper factors for the President or the Senate to consider in se-
lecting Justices. At the very least, if it were clear that Presidents and 
Senators largely felt this way, whatever the public’s view, it might 
significantly dampen the debate about how to unsettle what the Su-
preme Court has already settled.65 And of course, a very powerful 
rule of stare decisis, adhered to scrupulously by the Justices, might 
have a similar effect.66  
 Another possible response, this one closer to the surface of Alex-
ander and Schauer’s argument, is that although our system values 
stability, political market failures conceal that preference. Specifi-
cally, Alexander and Schauer claim that ordinary politics fails to 
match the level of stability the judiciary can ideally achieve.67 But 
there is a minor puzzle here they do not resolve. If stability is valu-
able to all of society, why is it not already produced at the optimal 
level by the political market? 
                                                                                                                      
ment from dispute without necessarily resolving the dispute about the judges who made 
it); Post & Siegel, supra note 21, at 1042 (“Through the appointment and confirmation 
process . . . the people in the end will have the form of constitutional law that they deem 
fit.”). 
 65. But cf. Post & Siegel, supra note 21, at 1030 (“No plausible version of judicial su-
premacy would prevent citizens from voting for a President because they believe he will 
appoint Supreme Court Justices who will express the citizens’ own view of the Constitution 
. . . .”). It is, of course, hard to think of a judicial rule that could achieve such an effect. One 
possible step in that direction would be a conflict of interest rule that required Justices to 
recuse themselves in any constitutional case on which they have expressed a view that 
could have been known by the President or the Senate. As for Professors Post and Siegel’s 
complaint, it is unclear from their work why a system that tries in this way to discourage 
private contemplation of the Constitution is less “plausible” than other forms of settlement. 
Indeed, the object of settlement generally seems to be to relieve the public and politics of 
the burdens (along, of course, with the autonomy) that such contemplation entails. Their 
argument thus seems addressed more to the claims of settlement generally than to any 
particular instrumental route to closing off the political manipulation of judicial outcomes. 
I address what I take to be their psychological point about the overall plausibility of set-
tlement later, in Part V.B.  
 66. But see Whittington, supra note 63, at 801-04. 
 67. See Alexander & Schauer, Defending Supremacy, supra note 18, at 476-77; see 
also Peabody, supra note 17, at 73-74 (challenging Alexander and Schauer’s hypothesis 
that the other branches cannot make authoritative decisions that promote stability). 
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 Public choice analysis suggests a possible answer.68 In a nutshell, 
public choice predicts that a regulation with obvious substantial im-
pact on a relatively small, well-defined group is likely to face a stiff 
challenge if its benefits would flow subtly and thinly to a diverse ma-
jority.69 The caveat, however, is that this outcome is only a general 
tendency, and it may change if the regulators, for whatever reason, 
are less subject to the intensity, rather than sheer numerosity, of 
constituent preferences.70 
 However, even with that caution flag raised, public choice still has 
a lot to offer Alexander and Schauer. Stability seems like a fine ex-
ample of a public good we would expect to be frequently subdued by 
more concrete interests. For the most part, the benefits of predict-
ability and repose flow broadly to everyone in society, but their exact 
measures are hard to quantify. In contrast, the incentives to cheat 
and to allow debate and deviation are powerful, and stability’s power 
to restrain them is weak. Stability, in short, is the classic “common” 
so prone to tragedy: with each poaching from the shared grazing 
land, the poacher benefits much more than the shared land is hurt.  
In turn there are a lot of poachers. Eventually, there will be no land 
to graze. The political process will struggle to resist that process be-
cause each set of poachers will offer a benefit more tangible than sta-
bility to a group far more cohesive than society as a whole.71  
                                                                                                                      
 68. In brief, public choice theory predicts that the decisions of government officials re-
flect not only the interests of the officials’ constituents, but also the intensity with which 
those constituents express their interest. See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic 
Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971), reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
ANTHOLOGY, supra note 1, at 399, 402. Since voters often have limited information about 
public policy and limited time in which to gather information and act on it, the average ra-
tional voter relies on others to monitor and lobby government officials on her behalf. Id. 
There is obviously a diminishing need to rely on others to garner information as the impact 
of any given policy becomes more obvious to that hypothetical voter—as the group of other 
people the voter could rely on to fight on her behalf diminishes, she calculates that she will 
have to fight more fiercely for herself, so that she is less inclined to “free-ride” on others’ 
lobbying efforts. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS 
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 21, 35 (1971); Stigler, supra, at 402. If her interest group is 
fairly small and it is easy for members to recognize what they hold in common with each 
other, they will have an easier time coming together as an effective lobbying force. Stigler, 
supra, at 402. 
 69. Stigler, supra note 68, at 402. 
 70. See David B. Spence, A Public Choice Progressivism, Continued, 87 CORNELL L. 
REV. 397, 398 (2002). 
 71. Further, in part because the gain from stability is so unquantifiable, it is very 
easy for the cheater to paralyze the majority by arguing that most of that value will re-
main even if we cheat a little here or there. We are still mostly predictable, the cheater ar-
gues, even if we make this one exception, and if we promise there will be no more excep-
tions, then we keep all of the value of stability in the future and get the benefit of a better 
rule! Ultimately, of course, the system recognizes the potency that such an argument will 
have in the future and stops expecting the rule to defy would-be cheaters. Thus, stability 
collapses. Nonetheless, it is difficult, I submit, to organize a political coalition based on 
such an abstract claim. 
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 It might be argued that the cheaters also value stability—at least 
once they have won. It is in the interest of any coalition to lock in its 
gains—in effect, to make true its claim that its exception will be the 
only one.72 Thus many theorists who study deals, both in legislation 
and in contract, have suggested that powerful deal-making coali-
tions, even those who at one time were on opposite sides, might fight 
against future cheaters to freeze the terms of their own deals.73 If so, 
then we might actually expect a relatively high level of stability to 
arise purely out of politics. As I have argued elsewhere, however, I 
think the theorists I just mentioned have it wrong.74 Even in a very 
stable legal system, the world itself changes. The fixed-price re-
quirements contract that looks appealing to the supplier when prices 
are low looks like an albatross when the market jumps. A powerful 
central government that is appealing to a mercantile society in a hos-
tile globe full of enemies may be intrusive and too expensive to an 
agrarian nation in a time of peace. Wise deal-makers recognize not 
only that future flexibility may be needed, but also that their own 
capacity to design rules to allow the best choices in the future may be 
limited at the time of the deal.75 Thus, whatever the force of the claim 
that stability is better for society as a whole, actors who are moti-
vated primarily by preserving their one deal are likely at best to be 
ambivalent about a very rigid system of legal rules.  
 One other objection to this public-choice-oriented critique of poli-
tics as a preserver of stability might be that, as I mentioned at the 
outset, it is not inevitable that public servants will respond to the ex-
pressed intensity of their constituents’ preferences. Of course, absent 
the collective action problems that public choice addresses, it is 
probably preferable that our government pay attention to how much 
the populace cares about an issue. Intensity of preference may well 
be a reasonable stand-in for overall utility, in that weighing the op-
posing sums of intensity might be a guide for the government in se-
lecting net positive utility outcomes. If possible, then, it might be 
preferable to design an institution that could filter out the intensity 
of actual or hypothetical public preferences from the distortions that 
sometimes arise when communicating them. Failing that, if we could 
agree on a preeminent public good, we might try to design an institu-
                                                                                                                      
 72. See Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of 
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176  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:157 
 
tion that would select that good even in defiance of a strongly ex-
pressed public preference for the contrary. In his individual writing, 
Schauer has advanced this second strategy as another justification 
for assigning judges as guardians of rights.76 Now that we under-
stand that stability itself can be seen as the same sort of public good 
as more traditional rights, it is apparent that Schauer’s two argu-
ments are closely interrelated. At the same time, they are vulnerable 
to a single common criticism: that some political (that is, not judicial) 
institution could conceivably perform the same function, if only there 
were a realistic way of ensuring that the institution would value the 
chosen public good over constituents’ preferences—or value it at least 
as much as a court would. 
 The case for exclusive judicial defense of stability, therefore, must 
answer the claims of social psychology and its potential implications 
for the use of institutional ideology to constrain decisionmakers, po-
litical or otherwise. Criticism of what was for a time the predominant 
public choice view of regulation now contends that it is psychologi-
cally unrealistic to presume that government decisionmakers will 
necessarily pursue their own rational self-interest, which in turn 
generally means adherence to the intensity of their constituents’ 
preferences.77 Powerful social forces make us want to live up to our 
expected public role: we may feel that we give our lives meaning by 
acting out the narrative that defines our culture and the places for us 
in it.  Or we may simply desire approbation and the higher social ac-
ceptance and status that may come with fulfilling expectations.78 
Equally powerful forces—shame and shunning, loss of identity and 
status—may punish us when we fail to act as others expect.79 Over 
time, we may come to internalize these role norms.80 Thus, an insti-
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tution that believes its mission—its “ideology”—is to prefer the pub-
lic good over mere political preferences and is widely expected by the 
public to meet that task may well succeed.81  
 In consideration of this view it might be said that it is only differ-
ences in institutional ideology that distinguish judges from legisla-
tors, but that those differences could conceivably be erased. Judges 
who play an integral role in the administrative process may begin to 
see themselves more as political players than as “judges.” Realisti-
cally, it is almost as much in a judge’s rational self-interest to pander 
to strong preferences as it is for a congressman. Judges may desire 
higher judicial offices with greater prestige and power for which an-
other confirmation hearing will be required. Supreme Court Justices 
may harbor political ambitions. Dean Kramer theorizes that a sig-
nificant source of state influence over federal officials is that federal 
officials feel ties to the local state political parties from whence they 
sprung.82 The same is likely true of judges. And judges may ration-
ally calculate, as many agency staff are said to do, that they would be 
rewarded upon retirement by a grateful favored interest group.83 
That these inducements seem on their faces so weak and implausible 
is testimony to the powerful expectation that they will largely be 
looked on with disdain by our judges. But surely the same is possible, 
at least in theory, for political actors as well. There was a period 
when thoughtful scholars of administrative law believed that agency 
personnel could be expected to disregard lobbyists in favor of the 
public good.84 The Senate, at least at one time, aspired to be a model 
of independent deliberation removed from the everyday struggle of 
politics.85 What if those norms were considerably more forceful and 
more durable? Could Alexander and Schauer still argue that the 
courts are uniquely qualified to preserve stability, or even rights 
generally? 
 Proponents of judicial exclusivity now have to argue that these di-
vergent results are not coincidental. Ultimately, institutional ideol-
ogy looks to be an expectations game with the possibility of circles 
                                                                                                                      
 81. See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 
562, 570 (2000); Edward L. Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 711, 767 
(2001); Suchman & Edelman, supra note 80, at 919; cf. Mark Tushnet, Non-Judicial Re-
view, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 453, 455 (2003) (arguing that “ideological commitments and 
bureaucratic missions” explain why nonjudicial actors might engage in rigorous constitu-
tional review). 
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both vicious and virtuous. Small failures to live up to an institution’s 
ideology might breed public cynicism, which in turn will lower the 
psychological pressure on institution members to conform, leading to 
poorer performance and yet lower expectations. In the opposite direc-
tion, very high public expectation might result in self-selection of 
candidates who believe in the institutional ideology and think they 
can comply. Clearly, institutional design will matter. We know and 
expect that elected officials will respond to constituent demands.86 It 
will take unusually virtuous behavior, or special internal institu-
tional design, to reverse that expectation. Other institutions, de-
signed and perhaps justified to the public expressly to separate their 
decisionmakers from elective pressure, begin life with the gift (if de-
fense of second-order public preferences is what we desire) of a con-
current expectation that they will be less attendant to short-term 
voter demands. In this account, it may be that the Progressives’ de-
mocratization of the Senate, in conjunction with the rhetoric of direct 
democracy that they used to mobilize the nation for constitutional 
amendment,87 is precisely what undermined the Senate as a useful 
defender of stability or rights.  Courts, designed to be as distant from 
public demands as we could make them, and which are defended of-
ten on just that ground,88 began with a distinct expectations edge.  
 I doubt that this account is entirely satisfying. Political ideology, 
however vicious the circle of cynical expectations, is probably not ir-
reversible. As discussed in much greater length below, I very much 
doubt that the political virtue of courts is self-sustaining. But the de-
fender of judicial exclusivity at least can claim that the fate of stabil-
ity is more precarious when it rests in political rather than judicial 
hands. And there is a good explanation for why we have not seen sig-
nificant stability emerge from the political marketplace. 
 2. Normative Challenges 
 Settlement has at least a plausible excuse for failing to fit our po-
litical system. What about on the normative side? In my view, the 
mainstream critique of Alexander and Schauer’s account of exclusiv-
ity, although in some senses extremely persuasive, ultimately brings 
us to a stalemate. 
 Again, the prevailing criticism of the exclusivity argument is 
aimed at the premise that settlement is a premium value that only 
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courts can adequately preserve.89 For critics, settling law when the 
development of the law is ill-informed and autocratic seems, at best, 
foolish.90 In contrast, allowing the political branches to consider and 
to develop constitutional doctrine allows courts to gather practical 
insight into difficult policy and empirical questions that may under-
lie their constitutional decisions (especially as those facts change 
over time).91 Some of those empirical questions might include popular 
preference for a particular moral, ethical, or utility outcome.92  
 The settlement proponent, however, can answer that courts are 
able to obtain largely the same information. To the extent that this 
critique simply depends on an information shortage, on an absence of 
practical examples, or on a foreshortened period of ferment before the 
court must lock in a particular rule, we could simply expand the field 
of judicial vision. Not all social dispute is wasteful; settlement only 
aims to cut off debate once it reaches the point at which it becomes 
wasteful.93 So the Supreme Court could use avoidance techniques to 
allow controversies to simmer among lower courts and in the real 
world until it feels confident it has a good answer, or until it feels 
that the benefits of a better answer would be outweighed by further 
divisions. Even at that point, the Court can look to foreign courts and 
foreign governments to see how they have resolved similar issues. 
Similarly, state interpretation of state constitutional law might offer 
opportunities for comparative constitutional law in a population that 
is even more likely than the international community to reflect over-
all domestic views.94 Exclusivist courts also do not have to be closed 
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off to new information. Although, as I have mentioned, there will be 
pressure within an exclusive regime to develop a very strong rule of 
stare decisis, the courts might still try to strike a balance between 
convincing the public that an issue is truly settled and reexamining 
an issue when the underlying circumstances seem genuinely to have 
changed. Finally, the cardinal characteristic of settlement is that it is 
autocratic; for the settlement proponent, the fact that the Court 
takes a decision away from the people is the main benefit of judicial 
decision, not a cost.95       
 Proponents of shared constitutional interpretation (including the 
author of this Article) have also claimed that overlapping interpre-
tive authority diminishes the Court’s “countermajoritarian diffi-
culty.”96 In its classic form, the “difficulty” is that courts cannot act 
meaningfully unless the political branches are willing to accept their 
authority.97 This presents a dilemma when a court can anticipate 
that its efforts to protect some politically unpopular right will en-
counter “massive resistance.”98 Professor Bickel famously argued 
that, as a result, courts must at times be parsimonious with rights, 
based on the theory that the public will tolerate only so much distur-
bance before it would simply defy judicial decree, and the courts 
should do all they can to put off that day.99 The shared constitutional 
interpretation theory draws significantly from Bickel’s argument, 
claiming that by allowing other political actors to protect second-
order rights when there happens to be a coalition available, ready to 
stand up for them, the judiciary can save itself from being the sole 
target of majority discontent.100  
 Again, the exclusivity proponent has some answers. First, exclu-
sivity, too, can conserve scarce judicial authority. In a regime where 
settlement has truly taken hold, the Supreme Court would only have 
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to decide an issue once (unless it wanted itself to revisit the ques-
tion).  
 The stability proponent also doubts that the countermajoritarian 
difficulty is as serious as Bickel claimed. She believes that the public 
will recognize that it needs a source of final authority.101 Thus, the 
settlement proponent might first argue that the public at least some-
times will see the utility of the rule of law values she espouses, even 
if public choice analysis suggests that it sometimes will not act on 
that realization. Further, the settlement proponent can assert that 
rational actors will recognize, as the drafters of a contract sometimes 
do, that for a productive deal to move forward they need to agree that 
any future disagreements will simply be decided by a judge.102  
 Naturally, none of these claims is even nearly universally true. 
Again, the possibility of principled behavior by public officials may 
swim against the tide of public cynicism. That cynicism is fed by the 
inevitable likelihood that sometimes the practical benefits of adher-
ing to judicial decision will be outweighed by the gains from “cheat-
ing” on settlement. Surely one deviation will not drive away invest-
ment or break the deal. Yet it will produce real gains for the cheater.  
The more rampant the cheating, the more cynical we become. And so 
our representatives play more and more often to what we want, and 
not to what the Court tells us we ought to do. Still, the proponent of 
stability can argue that its benefits at least slow this progression and 
offer the possibility, however faint, of a virtuous circle in which the 
public supports the Court in its efforts to protect stability and other 
public goods from themselves and other would-be cheaters.  
 Thus the defender of judicial exclusivity has some fairly strong re-
sponses to the normative claims of its critics about the virtues of the 
opportunities foregone by sticking to settlement above other values. 
More than that, in the end she can answer them all with a shrug. 
Yes, she might say, collaborative interpretation gives us “better” an-
swers in some sense. But Alexander and Schauer concede that point 
almost from the very start.103 Their claim is that settlement is more 
valuable than any incremental gains in the “right” answer to a con-
stitutional question that might flow from an alternative methodol-
ogy.104 As a result, they make themselves virtually unassailable on 
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the normative values of settlement, because it is largely incommen-
surable with the “better” results they waive aside. That is especially 
true because our preference for more informed or democratic out-
comes might vary depending on the underlying right that is to be de-
cided. It may be more fruitful, then, to consider the negative case 
against settlement. I do that in the next subsection. 
 3. The Dred Scott Decision 
 So it is difficult to say whether settlement, if it is all that its pro-
ponents say, compares favorably to the chance to reach better but 
less predictable results. On the other hand, it is fairly easy to chal-
lenge the merits of settlement itself. Many critics of Alexander and 
Schauer quickly pointed out that settlement is hardly desirable when 
the rule that is settled is Dred Scott or Plessy v. Ferguson.105 Any sys-
tem, these commentators say, that expects the political branches to 
accept Dred Scott as binding authority is obviously wrong.106 That 
point is fairly trenchant when the question is how the Executive 
should respond to judicial interpretation—it dramatizes how high the 
costs of abandoning better constitutional results can be. But it is al-
most irrelevant to my question, which is how the judiciary should re-
spond to the Executive. We can hardly expect judges to agree that 
their decisions can be freely disobeyed when “wrong.” If judicial deci-
sions are to be anything other than friendly advice, they cannot in-
vite litigants to disregard them when the litigants disagree.107 To the 
extent that inviting alternative viewpoints improves inputs into the 
judicial process or allows an opportunity for judicial reappraisal un-
der changed facts, rules allowing reconsideration or reopening—with 
the court’s consent—would serve the same function better.  
 Applying the settlement principle to Dred Scott, however, does 
raise a serious weakness of the settlement case for exclusivity. Legal 
settlement does not necessarily entail societal settlement. Rather, le-
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gal settlement only shifts the debate from what the law is to whether 
the law should be disobeyed.108 Similarly, a regime in which constitu-
tional law was highly settled might result in a correlative response 
from political actors, who might (in government) streamline the 
amendment process or (in the private sector) develop institutions to 
mobilize affected constituencies for a national effort to change the 
law.  
 Alexander and Schauer seem to acknowledge this argument, but 
claim that settlement at least results in more stability and less de-
bate than we would have otherwise.109 They assert that because the 
debate about whether to disobey the law begins with a heavy pre-
sumption that the law ought to be obeyed, in most cases legal settle-
ment will substantially end social disagreement as well.110 That as-
sertion presumes that law exerts some significant psychological force 
on citizens. For the reasons I have just explained, law’s binding psy-
chological force to some extent depends on public perception that de-
fying the law is wrong.111 Thus, disobedience grows as it goes, so that 
relatively isolated protests may over time lead to more widespread 
weakening of law’s settling power. Call it the “broken windows” the-
ory of constitutional law.  
 In short, Alexander and Schauer seem somewhat to overstate the 
extent to which settlement in fact settles. And, of course, a law that 
is widely disobeyed is not especially predictable. Again, though, this 
is not exactly a disqualifying argument. It might be that settlement, 
however hobbled, is still more valuable than the values of coopera-
tion, but that looks increasingly tenuous.  
B.   Why Not Settle for Judicial Review? 
 Suppose now that we continue with the assumption that stability 
is our premiere value, and we are satisfied that the judiciary is 
uniquely qualified to promote it. Turn back then to the central ques-
tion: How should a court respond to an agency that defends its regu-
lation as a product of constitutional reasoning? I would argue that 
the two premises we have accepted so far (that is, the value of stabil-
ity and judicial preeminence in defending it) are inadequate to ex-
plain why a court would be obligated to invalidate the regulation. In 
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other words, for stability at least, it is possible to decouple the justifi-
cation for judicial review from the presumed rationale for exclusivity. 
The heart of the problem for exclusivity is a tension between Article 
III limits on the independent and case-specific nature of federal judi-
cial decision and the policymaking role of an agency.  
 In brief, judicial exclusivity and modern regulation challenge each 
other because, for the most part, the agency acts first. It is the 
agency that formulates policy in advance of any actual controversy; 
often, no justiciable antagonistic relationship arises until the 
agency’s policy is so far developed that it is clear how private parties 
will be affected.112 Indeed, rules of standing aside, Article III argua-
bly limits judicial review of agency policy to “final” agency actions be-
cause review before that point might be the equivalent of an advisory 
opinion.113 Therefore, when agency regulation involves “novel” consti-
tutional issues, the agency will often need to resolve them in the first 
instance without the benefit of judicial involvement, or risk develop-
ing and implementing its resolution without knowing if its plans will 
comply with future judge-made constitutional law. 
 At first glance, it is hard to see why we should prohibit prelimi-
nary interpretation by other actors even if we agree that stability is 
important and judges are best positioned to defend it.114 The uncer-
tainty and disputatiousness that exclusivity aims at eliminating will 
persist until the reviewing court issues its decision, whether or not 
the agency acknowledges and tries to account for the possible consti-
tutional problem. So there is no obvious stability benefit to foreclos-
ing pre-judicial interpretation. And, as other commentators have ob-
served, there are substantial benefits to the Court in having the in-
sights of other branches before rendering its own decision: the Court 
can learn about a wider range of policy implications, consider popular 
views of what may be competing notions of justice, and so on.115 If we 
are going to lock in a rule, we ought to lock in a good one.  
 The problem here is that if judicial exclusivity makes such modest 
claims on agencies, it becomes redundant. Judicial consideration of 
an agency decision after it has been made, where that consideration 
accepts the validity of the initial agency analysis but probes its accu-
racy, is not exclusivity at all. It is judicial review. Exclusivity is only 
meaningful in an Article III world if it in some way would cause 
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courts to reject interpretations that would survive review for Merry-
man and Klein supremacy.116    
 But this is not the end of our inquiry; exclusivity likely demands 
more than judicial review alone. I placed “novel” in quotation marks 
quite deliberately. There are at least three varieties of novelty to 
consider. First is the basic blank slate novelty: no court has ruled on 
the issue before.117 Next is a situation where the problems of applica-
tion can be so indeterminate that the novelty is essentially a blank 
slate: does privacy of the home include privacy in one’s infrared 
emissions?118 And last, an agency could argue that recent experience 
in applying the present rule, or other change of circumstances, so 
throws the Court’s premise into question that any reasonable person 
would assume that the Court would want to revisit its rule.  
 The challenge for the judicial exclusivity proponent lies in decid-
ing whether to distinguish between these categories, and if so, how.119 
Each additional layer of “novelty,” as I have sketched them, extentu-
ates the trade-off between stability and the amount of information a 
court has available when formulating and enforcing a rule over time. 
By hypothesis, we assume that judges must prefer consistent an-
swers over “right” answers. But each of the three layers is faithful in 
its fashion. Must the stability proponent always prefer the most sta-
ble set of rules? Or can exclusivity be carved so that courts can cap-
ture some benefits of joint regulation while striving to stay predict-
able enough to capture most of the benefits of stability?  
 If we opt for maximum stability, then it is arguably the case that 
we would have to prohibit agencies from engaging even in genuine 
blank slate constitutional consideration. Efforts to distinguish among 
different forms of “novelty”—some permissible, some not—will be 
hard to predict, the object of considerable debate, and subject to po-
litical gaming by the executive and private parties. Obviously, the 
lines between these categories or between any one of them and law 
that is not “novel” at all are not bright. They call up all of the famil-
iar and age-old problems of defining precedent and holding.120 To 
                                                                                                                      
 116. In other words, review to ensure that the decision was correct. For my explanation 
of Merryman and Klein supremacy, see supra text accompanying notes 43-47. 
 117. See Gant, supra note 62, at 395. 
 118. See Dorf, supra note 10, at 11-12 (observing that because of inherent value judg-
ments in applying constitutional terms, “there is no such thing as ‘adhering’ to an old 
meaning in a new context”). 
 119. Cf. Paulsen, supra note 17, at 272 (arguing that there is no significant difference 
between executive interpretation when there is a prior judicial decision on point and when 
there is not); Whittington, supra note 63, at 790 (considering trade-offs between different 
layers of stability and benefits of cooperation). 
 120. See, e.g., Lawson & Moore, supra note 17, at 1296-97 (discussing the “degree to 
which a content based theory of interpretation . . . can generate clear answers to constitu-
tional questions); Monaghan, supra note 59, at 763-67 (analyzing “[t]he meaning of prece-
dent”). 
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those dilemmas we must now add considerations about whether 
binding precedent for a court should also be binding on an extrajudi-
cial entity. Plainly, some of the debate over how to categorize a new 
policy will necessarily involve the merits of the underlying set of con-
stitutional values. For example, whether a policy involves a new ap-
plication of settled precedent may depend on what values underlie 
the prior holding. For all these reasons, permitting debate about 
whether an issue is novel, and if so, whether in a permissible or im-
permissible way, may be the same as allowing debate on the consti-
tutional question itself. Thus, for the defender of settlement as the 
premiere value, novelty is an all-or-nothing proposition.121  
 Again, if this is the goal of exclusivity, judicial review alone might 
be sufficient in reaching it. This view of the stability rationale is, in 
essence, a negative image of one argument in favor of textualist in-
terpretation of statutes.122 I mention this parallel, however imperfect, 
because it raises a thorny point for the advocate of exclusivity. The 
rationale for legislative exclusivity—that is, for textualism—includes 
an argument that is not really available when we talk about judicial 
exclusivity. As Judge Calabresi pointed out long ago, what is genu-
inely at stake in arguments about judicial interpretation of statutes 
is the burden of inertia.123 Congress or an agency can always fix judi-
cial “mistakes,” but that imposes significant costs not only on the 
government entity, but also on the enacting coalitions. These costs 
include the burdens of monitoring judicial decisions, identifying old 
or new allies, reorganizing, and cranking up the lobbying apparatus 
for another round.124 In contrast, judicial review of “wrong” or desta-
bilizing decisions by extrajudicial actors can be had much more read-
                                                                                                                      
 121. See Sherwin, supra note 104, at 68. It is worth mentioning again that my analysis 
ignores “predictive” interpretation—interpretations in which an agency is simply trying to 
decide whether it will comply with what a court has held or would hold. Exclusivity has no 
quarrel with predictive interpretations because they acknowledge, rather than deviate 
from, judicial control. Cf. Monaghan, supra note 12, at 26 (noting that we could view 
agency legal interpretation simply as an announcement to the public of the position the 
agency will attempt to argue in court).  
 122. That is, some textualists assert that the political branches are more expert in 
their policy judgments and more accountable to public preferences. See, e.g., Manning, su-
pra note 10, at 625-26. In the starkest versions of the accountability argument, regulation 
is described as the result of a deal between conflicting interest groups who use the political 
process to memorialize the outcome of their agreement. See Easterbrook, supra note 73, at 
540-44. In either case, the claim is that judges cannot be trusted to alter the express terms 
of legislation. Even though later judicial modification might help keep a “deal” consistent 
with what the parties intended over time, the concurrent danger is that the court will use 
modified circumstances as a pretext to impose its own preferences or will simply err and 
unseat what the original enacting coalition might have wanted. Similarly, the rationale for 
judicial exclusivity just described would place strict limits on extrajudicial interpretation 
in order to reduce opportunities for agencies to intentionally or inadvertently unsettle 
what the judiciary has established.  
 123. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 92 (1982). 
 124. Id. at 92-93. 
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ily125—as illustrated by the traditional resistance to judicial review 
among those who generally prefer majoritarian decisionmaking.126 
Put another way, why is judicial exclusivity necessary if there is al-
ready judicial supremacy?127 
 Carefully tailored judicial review could achieve at least some of 
the same ends as judicial exclusivity. Start with constitutional juris-
prudence that leans more to Scalia than O’Connor—that is, that fa-
vors bright lines and formalism over nuanced, case-specific balancing 
of underlying values. That would make it considerably easier to rec-
ognize the bounds of a precedent, perhaps to the point where dis-
putes about what is truly novel are unlikely to affect planning. Be-
cause there is little underlying content, there is not much danger 
that in trying to draw new distinctions we will be drawn into a 
wasteful debate about fundamental values. Another jurisprudential 
move could be to push the boundaries of what constitutes an advisory 
opinion, allowing judicial review to slide backward in time into the 
administrative process. That maneuver at least cuts down on the 
amount of time that new controversies would remain unresolved. 
And with rulings issued before the administrative process is final, 
there is a smaller impact both on private planning (which presuma-
bly is unlikely itself to gel before the ultimate shape of the rule is 
known) and the efforts of the agency to guess what the court might 
think of its possible outcomes. In addition, courts might adopt doc-
trines that penalize agencies for changing course—such as adopting 
a default rule that favors the status quo, giving lower deference or 
requiring more extensive processes for changes in administrative po-
sition, and so forth. Similar rules could heavily penalize regulators if 
their constitutional judgments are in error—for example, by striking 
down the entire regulation instead of severing the unconstitutional 
portions.128 The result should be a more stable regulatory field, and 
one where regulators are reluctant to alter constitutional doctrine on 
their own.129  
                                                                                                                      
 125. Id. at 4-6. 
 126. Frank H. Easterbrook, The State of Madison’s Vision of the State: A Public Choice 
Perspective, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1328, 1342-43 (1994); see also Louis L. Jaffe, The Citizen as 
Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 
1033, 1038 (1968) (describing this view); Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public 
Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1221-22 (1982) (same). 
 127. See Gant, supra note 62, at 392. 
 128. See Vermeule, supra note 38, at 1962-63. 
 129. See 1 PIERCE, supra note 10, § 7.4, at 456-57 (arguing that more vigorous review 
of rulemaking procedure deters agencies from using the procedure to resolve major politi-
cal disputes); Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Proc-
ess, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1387-1436 (1992) (describing how a myriad of agency review tech-
niques discourages agencies from innovation and flexibility); cf. Monaghan, supra note 59, 
at 752 (observing that strong precedent is conservative and stabilizing). 
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 Taken severally or as a whole, these jurisprudential tactics may 
reasonably approximate the level of constitutional predictability that 
could be achieved by a regime of exclusive judicial interpretation.  
Like that regime, each jurisprudential tactic seems to achieve stabil-
ity at the cost of accuracy, or at least better information and ac-
countability. I doubt that the judicial review alternative is one that 
we would welcome if we were not willing to value stability above all. 
But the point is that exclusivity may not be necessary, even if stabil-
ity is our highest value and the judiciary is the institution best able 
to preserve it.  
 If the tactics of judicial review have a weak point in this analysis, 
it is that they do not seem to quite match exclusivity in foreclosing 
wasteful public debate. Bright doctrinal lines might simply lead to 
repeated efforts to further the same constitutional values along dif-
ferent paths. Formalism may lead to foment as much as finality. The 
tactic of weakening the severability doctrine could be undermined if 
determined proponents of an issue insert a poison pill in a valuable 
piece of regulation precisely in order to force the Court to strike the 
whole down so that what seems like a penalty in fact rewards the 
proponents with a “defeat” that energizes their supporters towards 
amendment or disobedience. However swiftly judicial review may oc-
cur, there will still be a window of time in which some extrajudicial 
constitutional debate will begin to bubble.  
 But these weak points are not fatal. For one thing, it is not certain 
to what extent the argument for stability rests on the claim that is-
sues can and ought to be forever decided, rather than that settlement 
cuts off at least drawn-out and unresolvable disagreement. Judicial 
review can accomplish the latter. Further, since what we are consid-
ering is a rule for evaluating the validity of a regulation, it must it-
self be enforced by the judiciary. Thus, wasteful constitutional debate 
could arise between the time a regulation is contemplated and when 
it is struck down, regardless of whether we accept exclusivity.  
 More fundamentally, exclusivity offers no comparative settlement 
advantage over judicial review, because exclusivity only submerges 
executive constitutional reasoning. That is, when we speak very 
broadly of whether judicial exclusivity is a wise principle, as Alexan-
der and Schauer do, we presumably addresses ourselves not only to 
judges but also to Presidents and administrators. If the President is 
persuaded, we need not worry whether he or she will try to evade the 
strictures of exclusivity. But when we speak, as I do here, of exclusiv-
ity as a rule for how judges should behave when reviewing executive 
action, then we have to consider seriously how executive actors are 
likely to respond.  
2005]                       JUSTICE OF ADMINISTRATION 189 
 
 The likely response to a judicial rule prohibiting constitutional 
reasoning as a component of rulemaking is almost surely a rhetorical 
layering of technical or other policy jargon on top of (and as a cover 
for) what is actually constitutional reasoning. On a psychological 
level, agency personnel probably will not want to stop thinking about 
justice, fairness, and individual rights—exactly for the reasons ex-
clusivity relies upon. Questions of justice are too fundamental to re-
linquish and sometimes too sharply defined to compromise.130 Indeed, 
their political intractability is what makes the settlement function so 
attractive.131 At the same time, because constituents have similarly 
deep feelings about rights and may find it easier to identify and or-
ganize with others who share their views about a particular right, 
there is significant political pressure on agencies to account for rights 
on some level.132  
 To the extent that judicial exclusivity allows “submerged” consti-
tutional reasoning to persist, and policymakers and the public are 
aware that it persists, judicial exclusivity fails to settle divisive social 
disagreement. Of course, as Boerne itself demonstrates, courts can 
always respond to this problem by extending the reach of exclusivity 
to legislation that, in the Court’s view, is in some significant sense 
“really” a constitutional decision.133 That approach has its own costs. 
As courts chase constitutional judgments further down the rabbit 
hole of policy justifications, the real reasons for public enactments 
grow increasingly opaque. Some court determinations are bound to 
be wrong, needlessly striking down a pure policy decision. So an ag-
gressive, Boerne-like stance on submerged constitutional reasoning is 
likely significantly to reduce the democratic character of regulation.  
 There are also practical difficulties. Suppose, for example, a regu-
lation relaxing controls on state ozone emissions that throughout the 
administrative record seems to rest entirely on an analysis of the ef-
fects of ozone transport on human respiration. In fact, however, the 
agency selected its rule in order to please state lobbyists who believe 
that a federalist reading of the Constitution made the regulation un-
constitutional (although there is no direct proof of this fact). Should a 
court strike down any regulation that favors an interest group that 
has taken a controversial constitutional stance?  
                                                                                                                      
 130. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 180-94, 475-80 (rev. ed. 1999). 
 131. See Alexander & Schauer, Extrajudicial Interpretation, supra note 18, at 1375-76. 
 132. See Galle, supra note 74, at 198-99. Constitutional reasoning by agencies is also 
inevitable in another sense. Every act by a governmental actor is a product of a constitu-
tional interpretation—a decision about the scope of the actor’s authority. See United States 
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 
3-4 (3d ed. 2000); Lawson & Moore, supra note 17, at 1286-87.  
 133. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997). 
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 Finally, there is a sizable subset of all executive decisions that are 
almost completely unreviewable by courts.134 Among the most promi-
nent decisions are pardons and vetoes, both of which have histori-
cally been loci for Presidents’ decisions that the Constitution justified 
or required a particular outcome.135 Decisions not to prosecute or not 
to bring a civil enforcement action generally require no public justifi-
cation and cannot be challenged.136 Commentators have argued that 
both decisions offer opportunities for exercise of executive constitu-
tional reasoning—for example, by declining to bring prosecutions 
where the executive concludes an application of the statute would be 
unconstitutional.137 One classic example is the Department of Jus-
tice’s “Petite Policy,” which limits the discretion of prosecutors to 
bring charges where the Double Jeopardy Clause might be impli-
cated.138 Obviously, as competing rules for judicial review of executive 
action, neither exclusivity nor review can do much to affect directly 
how the executive conducts its affairs in these areas, other than 
through the hope that by announcing a principle it will persuade the 
executive to go along, either directly or through popular pressure. 
The point is that, assuming such persuasive efforts will not be en-
tirely effective, there will remain under either regime a significant 
amount of extrajudicial constitutional debate. Neither approach can 
claim to “settle” contentious discussion entirely. The question, there-
fore, is necessarily one of degrees of partial success.  
 Taken together, the costs of a vigorous search for pretext and the 
challenging task of identifying it accurately mean that generally 
courts will not be able to eliminate submerged constitutional reason-
ing. Thus, they will be unlikely significantly to curtail social dis-
agreement. It is certainly the case that exclusivity has the capacity to 
reduce wasteful disputation. But so does judicial review generally. 
 In summary, the “settlement” case for precluding agencies from 
interpreting the constitution is not persuasive. It is true that the po-
litical market is unlikely to be as successful as the judiciary in de-
fending stability. It does not seem to follow, however, that agencies 
should be prohibited from interpreting the Constitution in the first 
                                                                                                                      
 134. See Johnsen, supra note 17, at 115; Paulsen, supra note 17, at 264-65; see also 
Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 77, at 1306 (making a similar point about congressional 
decisionmaking). 
 135. See Lawson & Moore, supra note 17, at 1280, 1288-89; Paulsen, supra note 17, at 
264-65. 
 136. See Johnsen, supra note 17, at 115; Paulsen, supra note 17, at 267-68. I say “gen-
erally” because there are rare situations, such as where a defendant makes out a prima fa-
cie case of vindictive or selective prosecution, in which the prosecutor may be obliged to ex-
plain why she declined to bring charges against one person but not another who seems 
similarly situated.   
 137. See Lawson & Moore, supra note 17, at 1280. 
 138. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-2.031 (2005), available at 
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instance, subject to some form of judicial review. Exclusivity may 
somewhat settle constitutional law, but so would carefully tailored 
judicial review. Given the costs of exclusivity—lost information, 
waste of administrative resources, lack of transparency—it is not ob-
vious why judicial exclusivity is preferable to narrower forms of judi-
cial supremacy, even if it is accepted that the courts’ “settlement” 
function is more important than other values.  
IV.   INSTITUTIONAL ADVANTAGE PART TWO: GETTING RIGHTS RIGHT? 
 There is now one remaining loose end. Settlement, as we have 
seen, is not a persuasive justification for exclusive judicial interpre-
tation of the Constitution. This is so notwithstanding the fact that 
settlement is a public good and the judiciary, therefore, is more likely 
to be able to preserve it. But what of other public goods, other sec-
ond-order preferences, other rights?139 Is there a credible argument 
that the judiciary is uniquely capable of preserving certain kinds of 
rights, so that we should prohibit other actors even from interpreting 
them?  
 This terrain is already very well mapped, and the answer is “no.” 
As a wide variety of commentators have pointed out, judicial en-
forcement of rights—even in a regime where judges are only supe-
rior, and not exclusive, interpreters—raises problems of paternal-
ism.140 That is, there is always risk that the “public good” the court 
hypothesizes will not match what the public would really prefer, but 
rather matches the court’s own (and perhaps idiosyncratic or ill-
informed) values. Exclusivity greatly heightens this risk by reducing 
opportunities for courts to confront alternatives and to see their con-
sequences played out over time.141 If our goal is to get “right” an-
swers, we should instead want to minimize such risks. 
 A small group of writers has recently suggested a related, al-
though more circumscribed, claim. They acknowledge the general 
virtues of collaborative interpretation, but argue that courts might 
legitimately be exclusive, or at least have the power of review, in 
                                                                                                                      
 139. See Friedman, supra note 101, at 2601-02 (arguing for role of judicial review in 
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 141. See Monaghan, supra note 46, at 28-29; Post & Siegel, supra note 13, at 514-15. 
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those areas where courts are most “competent” or politics least 
trustworthy.142 Evidently, the suggestion is that this allocation of in-
stitutional authority is less value-laden, and so less threatened by 
the problem of paternalism.143 Yet we must have criteria to evaluate 
competency. If the judiciary shall claim exclusivity in some areas, it 
is the judiciary that must determine those criteria and referee 
them.144 Thus, there is no reason to believe that dividing exclusive in-
terpretive power by competency results in decisions that are any 
more objective, uncontroversial, or “right” than other judicial value 
judgments, which everyone concedes are best made when shared.145  
 I want to highlight two less familiar points. The “counter-
majoritarian difficulty,” as I mentioned, may be a significant limita-
tion on judicial capacity to protect rights. At the very least, judges 
now seem to see popular dismay as a consideration they should take 
into account in their rights calculus.146 If the goal is to protect rights 
both accurately and thoroughly, we should be interested in opportu-
nities to further them with minimal political resistance. And so, as 
commentators like Robert Post and Reva Siegel have argued, courts 
ought to nurture constitutional deliberation by political actors where 
it sprouts, as long as they can be reasonably sure that the delibera-
tion will generally preserve rights as the court defines them.147 More 
than that, the court should try to shift responsibility for making the 
ultimate constitutional decision to the political actors—let Congress 
or an agency take the blame.148 Exclusivity, either literally or 
through judicial review that limits political invocations of the Consti-
tution strictly to meanings the Court has already elaborated, would 
(or, depending on how we read Boerne, does) make both of these tac-
tics very difficult. Limiting judicial review to ensure that political in-
terpretations remain within a range of possible constitutional mean-
ings, each of which is more or less adequately protective of the rights 
the Court is interested in, would expand judicial capacity and dis-
                                                                                                                      
 142. See Alexander & Solum, supra note 24, at 1633; Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of 
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tence as a response to Jeremy Waldron’s complaint that settlement by courts is inferior to 
settlement by representative majoritarian bodies. Alexander & Solum, supra note 24, at 
1631, 1633. 
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 147. Post & Siegel, supra note 13, at 516-17. 
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tribute credit or blame for the final form of the right between the 
court and its political partner.149  
 Additionally, exclusivity undermines psychological supports that 
might otherwise prop up political respect for rights. Again, principled 
behavior is partly created by societal expectation, which both frames 
how an individual actor approaches a problem and also puts external 
pressure on the actor to comply with the expected norm. I argued 
earlier that our federal judiciary begins with the high expectation 
that it will resist popular pressure because its institutional design 
was obviously conceived to achieve that effect and was publicly justi-
fied on that basis. Judicial insistence on exclusive judicial interpreta-
tion could have the opposite effect on the expectations for nonjudicial 
interpretation. If the judiciary’s view is at all credible, it will lead the 
public to conclude that political actors should not be expected to in-
terpret the Constitution, and that they are not capable of principled 
behavior. This prophecy may quickly become self-fulfilling. That in 
turn puts more and more pressure on the judiciary to reject that 
which would then become perceived as increasingly unprincipled po-
litical products.  
 In contrast, ordinary judicial review might strengthen nonjudicial 
policymakers’ inclinations to interpret rights. It is possible, as Pro-
fessor Tushnet writes, that judicial review may create a sort of judi-
cial overhang, in which Congress or an agency does not bother to 
think about the constitutional consequences of what it does, because 
it knows a court will.150 But if that is because regulators prefer to 
avoid waste,  the more rational strategy would often be to avoid the 
penalties of constitutional invalidity, especially in an initiative with 
substantial start-up costs.151 
 More importantly, injecting the judiciary into the regulatory proc-
ess, at least as an arbiter of intractable disputes, may have a salu-
tory effect on the self-image of all of the collaboration partners. 
                                                                                                                      
 149. I would add that exclusivity is a particular problem in our federal constitutional 
system, which limits courts to decide only discrete cases or controversies. Sometimes the 
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Again, institutional behavior is to some extent a self-fulfilling proph-
ecy. Sometimes regulators are public-minded because they are condi-
tioned to believe that is the socially appropriate behavior, and it is 
painful for human beings to violate social norms, especially those 
norms that are role-related.152 Judges too can have institutional ide-
als, which, again, may include a belief that their duty is to protect 
“rights.”153 The same ideals may filter down to other participants in 
the legal system. These ideals may also be reinforced by ritualized 
role-definition, such as in the attorney’s oath. Perhaps collaborative 
regulation participants, if made to feel that what they are participat-
ing in is truly “law” rather than just another deal, will be more in-
clined to think of themselves as legal actors bound to respect estab-
lished rule and principle. And judicial review, like other features of 
divided government, dampens the rate of policymaking reaction, as-
suring that there is time for republican deliberation about the direc-
tion of reform.154  
 Thus, exclusivity may unnecessarily place a heavy burden on 
judges by closing off the possibility of principled second-order deci-
sionmaking by political institutions. And it may place courts in the 
position of seeking remedies the Constitution, as it is presently writ-
ten, puts beyond their reach. If our primary objective is to maximize 
protection for rights and realize the best possible solution to rights 
dilemmas, then exclusivity is an unattractive strategy.  
V.   THE VIEW FROM THE BENCH: RHETORIC AND THE INSTITUTIONAL 
IDEOLOGY OF JUDGING 
 In the preceding Parts, I have focused on what we might call the 
exterior view of judicial functioning. That is, I have largely asked 
what allocation of powers an objective designer—a constitutional 
framer, perhaps—would want to set. In this, I have followed the pre-
vailing literature, which has considered these questions almost ex-
clusively from that perspective.155 But by standing behind a veil of ob-
jectivity, we may have missed how exclusivity looks from behind the 
bench. The judiciary may have its own unique institutional needs for 
claiming interpretive exclusivity when it reviews the decisions of 
other branches.  
 I argue in this Part that the very assertion of exclusivity, even if it 
proves not entirely effective, may serve an important role in the judi-
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ciary’s overall operation. In Part V.A. I consider first the place of ex-
clusivity in what I describe as the traditional account of judicial 
rhetoric, which posits that judicial rhetoric is generally aimed at dis-
arming public resistance to unpopular defenses of minority rights or 
other second-order preferences. My view is that, as in Part IV, a 
court that invokes exclusivity likely undermines its ultimate ability 
to set policy independent of the political branches.  
 Part V.B. discusses what I believe is a more novel explanation for 
the rhetoric of exclusivity: it is aimed within, at the Justices them-
selves, their successors, and the lower courts they supervise. The 
language of exclusivity, I argue, may be part of the Court’s way of 
creating and reinforcing an institutional ideology, carving a public 
ideal to which Justices and judges will aspire and sometimes adhere. 
I conclude that although this social psychological perspective has 
considerable explanatory power, it does not quite justify exclusivity 
in all aspects of constitutional reasoning and predicts only weakly, if 
at all, the aspects of constitutional reasoning in which exclusivity 
must be had.  
A.   The Balance Pole: Exclusivity as Mollifying Rhetoric 
 If our project in this Part is to justify exclusivity to judges, let us 
begin with the assumption that courts want to be effective at what 
they do. Public interest minded judges want to defend the populace 
against ill-advised efforts to disregard minority rights or erode other 
collective goods. Majoritarian judges want to marshall popular atten-
tion against regional defiance.  Even rationally self-interested judges 
with future gains on their minds will want to maximize the power of 
their decisions, so that their influence merits larger rewards.  
 Not surprisingly, some accounts of federal judging suggest that 
the operation of judicial review and the judicial language that ac-
companies it are designed to make it easier for federal courts to make 
policy.156 Again, the conventional story begins with the claim that 
federal courts must overcome the countermajoritarian difficulty in 
order to have any long-term efficacy.157 That is, when courts make 
decisions contrary to short-term political preferences, or at least con-
trary to what elected officials would choose, they generate resent-
                                                                                                                      
 156. See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 17, at 237; Gregory Casey, The Supreme Court and 
Myth: An Empirical Investigation, 8 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 385, 409 (1974) (arguing that “my-
thology” of neutral and objective judicial decisionmaking creates public support); Devins & 
Fisher, supra note 15, at 93-94; Gant, supra note 62, at 401-02 (claiming that “myth” of ju-
dicial finality and authoritativeness promotes public support for courts). 
 157. See Devins & Fisher, supra note 15, at 96-97. 
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ment.158 Over time, resentment becomes resistance.159 Yet, the judici-
ary is not truly final; it depends on the political branches, perhaps 
the very branches it is defying, to enforce its decrees and to grant it 
jurisdiction to continue supervision of any particular controversy.160  
 Judicial rhetoric then becomes a balancing pole courts can use to 
negotiate the tightrope between countermajoritarian action and pub-
lic acceptance. One of the major sources of public resistance, it is 
said, is that the general public may perceive judicial action as a sim-
ple substitution of the court’s own value or policy preference for the 
public’s own.161 This perception is aggravating not only because the 
public does not get what it wants but also because it may seem as 
though the judges are engaging in self-dealing, making decisions that 
further their own interests or elitist moral code over that of the rest 
of the community.162 Judicial rhetoric may aim to defuse at least the 
suspicion of self-dealing by attributing decisions to something other 
than what the judges themselves want—to precedent, to “the Fram-
ers,” to “strict construction” of the Constitution, or something simi-
lar.163 Consider Bush v. Gore, where the Court framed its discussion 
with a reminder that voting rights routinely are limited by “properly 
established legal requirements.”164 Justice Stevens, in the powerful 
conclusion to his dissent, warned that despite such efforts, the 
Court’s reason for its decision,165 distrust of the principled reasoning 
offered by the Florida Supreme Court, would undermine public con-
fidence in the objectivity of judicial decisions.166  
 There are several other points here as well. First, referring to 
widely shared collective public decisions of the past helps a court to 
claim that its audience shared in some part in the creation of the 
                                                                                                                      
 158. See id. at 91; Friedman, supra note 50, at 349-50; Michael J. Klarman, Brown, 
Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7, 85-129 (1994); Monaghan, 
supra note 59, at 753. 
 159. See Devins & Fisher, supra note 15, at 91; Klarman, supra note 158, at 85-129; 
Monaghan, supra note 59, at 753. 
 160. See Paulsen, supra note 17, at 223. 
 161. See Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part 
Three: The Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383, 1448-54 (2001). 
 162. See id.; Friedman, supra note 50, at 351; Keith J. Bybee, Legal Realism, Common 
Courtesy, and Hypocrisy, 1 LAW, CULTURE & HUMAN. 75, 81 (2005). 
 163. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 999-1001 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting); Bybee, supra note 162, passim; Monaghan, supra note 59, at 752 (citing 
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970)); Whittington, supra note 63, at 
809 (discussing Marshall’s view of distinction between law and politics); cf. KRAMER, supra 
note 17, at 98, 103 (noting that early judges staked claims to power of judicial review by 
asserting that they were acting as faithful agents for the people who had ratified the Con-
stitution); ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 19-22 (2000) (arguing that groups de-
velop norms against self-dealing in order to signal that they are trustworthy bargaining 
partners for future deals). 
 164. 531 U.S. 98, 103 (2000). 
 165. And, impliedly, its decision generally. 
 166. Bush, 531 U.S. at 128-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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outcome, which tends to reduce resentment and resistance.167 Fur-
ther, the language of “principle” might also appeal to our intuitive 
sense that in a republic we ought to accept principled applications of 
common basic ideals, even if we disagree with the outcome of a par-
ticular application.168 Even if this is not a feature of a basic under-
standing of what it means to live in a modern Western republic,169 
grounding judicial decision in the vocabulary of principle may at 
least suggest to the disagreeing public that their views, too, if per-
missible principled interpretations, may prevail in the future.  
 Of course, judicial rhetoric can also be a more straightforward ef-
fort to persuade. The Court might overturn the popular preference of 
the moment but argue that having an institution that defends rights 
is in the long-term interests of everyone: it protects public goods, of-
fers some long-term settlement of political disagreement, and pro-
vides all the other benefits that have already been seen. The Court 
may also try to use language not simply to persuade but to battle col-
lective action problems that might have produced a temporary pref-
erence contrary to the Court’s position.170 The public might not have 
learned all it could about an issue or thought all it could about the 
justice of a policy, because individuals assumed that if learning and 
pondering were worthwhile someone else would do it and act on it. A 
slumbering national majority that might not have taken action to 
correct localized injustice might be mobilized by a judicial call to 
arms.  
 Finally, when courts speak and write using the vocabulary of fun-
damental rights and constitutional command, they may be appealing 
to the special moral commitments of citizens. Consider, for example, 
a possible communitarian claim.171 Invoking the Constitution, the 
Framers, precedent, and principle may be a way of arguing that the 
Court’s decision is implied or required by common American ideals. 
That gives the opinion not only unique moral weight but also at least 
implicitly makes a claim on the community’s common commitment to 
what it means to be a member of that community. Or, as I have sug-
gested elsewhere, the language of constitutional interpretation, espe-
cially historically grounded interpretations, may imply a duty to obey 
                                                                                                                      
 167. See Devins & Fisher, supra note 15, at 90-98. 
 168. See Michelman, supra note 111, at 975-76; Monaghan, supra note 59, at 748-49. 
 169. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 189-90, 198-99 (1986). 
 170. See Dorf, supra note 10, at 78; Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private 
Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129 (1986). 
 171. Communitarians, although widely varied in their methods and conclusions, gen-
erally agree that justice arises out of shared definitions of what it means to be a proper 
member of a given community. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 169, at 19-215; MICHAEL J. 
SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 329-51 
(1996). 
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out of Lockean obligation or a sense of fair play.172 The Court frames 
its decision as a necessary incident of rules that existed before its de-
cision, while the audience was enjoying the benefits of living in a so-
ciety bounded by those rules. The implication is that it is now not fair 
for the public to object to a rule it has benefited from or could have 
avoided by exiting.173 
 On a superficial level, exclusivity seems a reasonable tool for 
achieving these goals. By appearing to divide legal reasoning into 
two spheres—one constitutional and exclusive to judges, the other 
political and open to all—courts can emphasize the unique and dis-
tinctive status of constitutional reasoning. That status reinforces ju-
dicial claims that countermajoritarian outcomes are not simply sub-
stitutions of judicial policy preference, but products of an entirely dif-
ferent mode of reasoning, one that produces “right” answers to inter-
pretations of constitutional text.174 Exclusivity might highlight for a 
doubting populace the unique value of an apolitical institution capa-
ble of resisting momentary pressures to preserve stability or other 
second-order preferences. With only one voice speaking, it is easier 
for the Court to persuade or lead opinion; uniqueness focuses atten-
tion on the solitary speaker and, obviously, makes dissenting posi-
tions more difficult to elaborate. This last point is especially impor-
tant if the Court wants to rely on claims of moral obligation to com-
ply with its views. In the modern era, rights regularly come into con-
flict, and the most controversial judicial decisions balance conflicting 
claims of right or justice.175 Consider the abortion debate or claims of 
individual freedom from putatively intrusive law enforcement efforts 
said to protect the community as a whole. If the Court concedes that 
other political actors also have legitimate roles in constitutional in-
terpretation, then the moral force of the Court’s interpretation is 
greatly diminished when its view is contrary to the balance struck, or 
said to be struck, by another branch.176  
                                                                                                                      
 172. Galle, supra note 74, at 217-18. 
 173. I am not endorsing contractual theories of social obligation, but rather only ob-
serving that they may be one form of obligation a court asserts against citizens.  
 174. See Whittington, supra note 63, at 809-11. 
 175. See Galle, supra note 74, at 218-19.  
 176. Id. This point, if one accepts it, suggests that Paulsen would probably have to ac-
cept my view if he gave his attention to the rule the judiciary should adopt for the scope of 
its own power. He argues that independent executive interpretation is constrained by the 
“formidable moral and political power” of judicial interpretations on overlapping subjects. 
Paulsen, supra note 17, at 301-02. Indeed, this constraint is central to his argument, for he 
concedes that without his version of interpretive checks and balances his extreme depart-
mentalism would be difficult to square with the Founders’ notions of limited government. 
Id. at 322-32. But independent judicial interpretations could hardly be meaningful con-
straints on contrary executive action if judges conceded that their views were simply 
kindly words of advice. As Paulsen acknowledges, the political pressure on the executive to 
comply with the judiciary’s judgment is keenest in an instance in which a court declares 
that the executive is bound to obey—when it issues a judgment against an executive offi-
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 These justifications ultimately fail for largely the same reasons 
exclusivity fails as an objective means of getting rights right. Coun-
termajoritarian courts should want to move to some degree toward 
minimalism, economizing on exercises of their own power and lever-
aging the potential for constitutional reasoning by other branches.177 
But an exclusive court is a maximalist court;178 not only must it carry 
the burden of constitutional interpretation alone, but it must also 
reach out to strike down lawmaking that infringes on its prerogative. 
Indeed, it may need to overreach even further; if the perception of ex-
clusivity is important, the Court must also police policies by other ac-
tors that might be perceived by the populace as a challenge to its 
uniqueness.  
 That problem becomes large if we also consider all of the ways 
that the underlying values of any particular right may inform other 
legal decisions. For any given right, there are a host of questions—
what remedies for violating the right are available, who can obtain 
them, when the interests of repose become more compelling than 
vindication of the right, how to forestall possible but hard to detect or 
punish violations of the right, to take just a few—whose answers all 
depend to one extent or another on the meaning and purpose of the 
underlying constitutional right and on how to balance that right 
against competing interests. We commonly think of all or most of 
those questions as matters of “enforcement” and not constitutional 
interpretation per se. Sooner or later, people will start wondering 
how “exclusive” the courts really are if they allow other actors to 
make what surely amount to fundamental decisions about the mean-
ing and scope of the constitutional rights courts supposedly are solely 
qualified to interpret.179 Courts will have to either expand their over-
sight to meet that expectation or acknowledge that constitutional 
reasoning can be shared. Ultimately, exclusivity becomes imperial 
overstretch, which collapses the very project the court is engaged in.  
 It is also likely, as discussed above, that cooperative interpreta-
tion is a better means to the same end. As Professor Waldron has ar-
gued, moral claims about the collective social meaning of community 
membership are more compelling when they arise out of the commu-
nity as a whole or from diverse and deliberative bodies drawn from 
                                                                                                                      
cer. Id. at 301. It follows that a court’s broader claim of power to bind other actors with its 
declarations increases the pressure on those actors to obey and thus more effectively 
checks their behavior, even if they do not themselves regard those declarations as strictly 
binding. But see Alexander & Schauer, Extrajudicial Interpretation, supra note 18, at 1365 
(claiming that other branches pay a political price for defying judgments but not for enact-
ing unconstitutional laws). 
 177. See Post & Siegel, supra note 13, at 516-19. 
 178. See Whittington, supra note 63, at 796. 
 179. Cf. Dorf, supra note 10, at 53 (noting that the processes of determining the mean-
ing of a legal rule and deciding how far it should extend are very similar). 
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the community and not from a narrow group of elites.180 Additionally, 
the public will become more informed and activated by a project it 
shares in than by a result that is announced by a distant herald.181 
And for obvious reasons, outcomes that are more sensitive to prevail-
ing norms are less likely to generate resistance than those that are 
merely hypothesized by judges.182  
 It could be argued, though, that a judicial rhetoritician can reduce 
these costs by identifying subsidiary “rights” questions and other co-
operative opportunities as something other than “constitutional,” so 
that allowing agencies or Congress to participate does not interfere 
with the Court’s rhetorical stance.183 Indeed, Boerne arguably adopts 
this approach; as I have argued elsewhere, the Boerne rule does not 
appear to extend to congressional enactments that, while probably 
enacted in order to effect a constitutional ideal, are formally justified 
as an exercise of ordinary policymaking under the Commerce Clause, 
not as interpretations of the Constitution.184 I still think that is basi-
cally right. If a court is not obliged in the course of reviewing or en-
forcing a regulation to acknowledge the legitimacy of the other 
branch’s constitutional reasoning, it can cling to its exclusive rhetori-
cal posture. Even for legislation that is plainly constitutionally in-
spired, a court can essentially take the attitude, “well, sure, that is 
what they say the Constitution means, but we do not have to deter-
mine whether that is right or even a proper ground for their consid-
eration, since the regulation can be sustained or applied on other 
grounds.”185 
                                                                                                                      
 180. JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 79-80, 105-18, 136-38, 141 (1999). 
 181. See Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders: Limits on Collaboration as the 
Basis for Flexible Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 411, 412 (2000); Susan P. Sturm, 
The Legacy and Future of Corrections Litigation, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 639, 721 & n.389 
(1993). 
 182. That is not to say that cooperation means deference to popular pressure. My claim 
is that cooperation gives us better insight not only into actual preferences but also into hy-
pothetical or ideal preferences. We can guess about how people would behave in some un-
real state, but the best tests of our suppositions will often come from real-world situations 
that may reflect one or more features of the ideal. Thus, the political market’s shadows, al-
though distorted, may give us some sense of the shape between the fire and the wall.  
 183. See Alexander & Schauer, Extrajudicial Interpretation, supra note 18, at 1385; 
Dorf, supra note 10, at 73 (proposing that courts might designate some portion of an an-
nounced legal norm as experimental). Professor Waldron argues, though, that these types 
of rhetorical maneuvers tend to reduce the quality of a court’s moral judgments. See Wal-
dron, supra note 42, at 140, 142. 
 184. Galle, supra note 74, at 219. Except in the minimal sense, discussed earlier, in 
which all statutes begin with a constitutional decision about the scope of the lawmakers’ 
appropriate power.  
 185. It is worth noting that this approach puts substantial theoretical pressure on the 
lines a court draws around its zone of exclusivity. If exclusivity is said to be justified be-
cause courts are uniquely suited to resolving questions of fundamental justice, then many 
statutes not formally grounded in the Constitution will nonetheless appear to require judi-
cial exclusivity.  
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 The utility of this sleight is fairly limited. The Court still must 
deal with regulation that would look to the public like an effort to 
evade its exclusivity requirement, because to be seen to tolerate 
transparent subterfuge would be the equivalent of ceding its unique 
authority. There is a similar problem with granting a blanket exemp-
tion to regulation that only “enforce” or “implement” constitutionally 
guaranteed rights, rather than interpret them.186 The actual scope 
and effectiveness of a rule depend upon how it is implemented. Ex-
clusivity will seem a fairly thin rhetorical straw on which to rest ju-
dicial authority if courts let other political actors decide the extent to 
which considerations of a constitutional right displace private order-
ing or ordinary government policy decisions. And, as I have just men-
tioned, actually deciding problems of enforcement will usually in-
volve analyzing the meaning of the underlying right and its impor-
tance relative to other policy considerations, as in the trade-off be-
tween repose and vindicating the right offered by statute of limita-
tions questions. However these issues are labeled, it will be clear at 
least to close observers that they involve constitutional reasoning.  
 The name game also would not likely save two important tools of 
cooperative interpretation: avoidance and prophylaxis. Avoidance is 
the canon of statutory interpretation in which a court will select a 
permissible but syntactically less-favored reading of a statute where 
the more favored reading would raise serious constitutional ques-
tions.187 Prophylaxis is the use of preventative or preemptive rules—
classically bright-line, judge-made rules—that aim to deter or other-
wise foreclose potential constitutional violations.188 The Miranda rule 
is the prototypical example.189 Avoidance and prophylaxis are coop-
erative because they invite, or at least permit, responses by the po-
litical branches.190 Congress or an agency can respond to an avoid-
ance interpretation by asserting that it in fact intended to press close 
against the line of unconstitutional conduct.191 Likewise, because 
prophylactic rules are said to be a sort of constitutional common law, 
they are at least in theory defeasible by statute.192 I have summa-
rized elsewhere the considerable virtues of avoidance as a technique 
for enforcing constitutional rights. Among others, the technique per-
mits a court to further the values underlying a particular constitu-
tional rule without ruling out political responses that might contrib-
                                                                                                                      
 186. See Dorf, supra note 10, at 73. 
 187. See Schauer, supra note 38, at 1949. 
 188. See Monaghan, supra note 46, at 21-22. 
 189. Id. 
 190. See Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1003, 
1005 (1994); Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 
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 191. ELY, supra note 55, at 4-5. 
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ute to the court’s understanding of what the rule means and how it 
should be implemented.193 Prophylaxis can function similarly.194 Un-
der both of these methods, the constitutional right in essence unfolds 
into two parts, one exclusively judge-made, the other initially judge-
made but open to political development.195  
 This close relationship between core rights and cooperative appli-
cations of rights, however, is precisely the problem for the tradi-
tional, rhetorical basis for exclusivity. Once it is recognized that 
avoidance and prophylaxis are both really forms of constitutional 
elaboration, they come into obvious tension with the idea of judicial 
exclusivity.196 This would be true regardless of whether as a semantic 
matter we called one half of the right “constitutional” interpretation 
and the other half “statutory” interpretation or judicial common law. 
It is still obvious that cooperation is cooperation and not exclusivity. 
Courts will have a tough time selling the idea that only they are com-
petent or trustworthy enough to craft constitutional policy, but that 
Congress and agencies can, ahem, also craft constitutional policy.  
 In sum, what I have called the traditional account of judicial 
rhetoric posits that judges use the language of rights in order to stir 
political support for or pacify opposition to their positions, or to lay 
claim to moral obligations to obey the law. This rhetorical posture is 
superficially stronger when judges can say that they, and they alone, 
are the authoritative interpreters and elaborators of rights. But in 
practice exclusivity undermines judicial effectiveness by overextend-
ing it, and it compares unfavorably to shared interpretation in 
achieving the same ends.  
B.   Exclusivity as an Element of the Constitutive Rhetoric of Judging 
 We saw earlier that institutional ideology can be a significant in-
fluence on how policymakers behave. In this Part, I suggest that tra-
ditional analysis of judicial rhetoric overlooks the significance that 
judicial language may play in constructing and reinforcing an ideol-
ogy of judging. It is true, I argue, that such rhetoric is a tool for fa-
cilitating principled judicial decisionmaking, but it acts in the main 
                                                                                                                      
 193. Galle, supra note 74, at 205. 
 194. See Dorf, supra note 10, at 71. 
 195. See Coenen, supra note 96, at 1862-66; Galle, supra note 74, at 205-06; Levinson, 
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 196. Cf. Dorf, supra note 10, at 66 (stating that judicial rules sometimes have to be uni-
form in order for the court to be a credible enforcer, as in the case of individual rights). 
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not on the public, which may be relatively indifferent to judicial lan-
guage, but rather on the judges themselves.  
 Let us begin again with the modest assumption that judges want 
to realize their own goals. For some judges, that may include a com-
mitment to principled defense of constitutional rights, second-order 
preferences, and so on. Even self-dealing judges will want to encour-
age other judges, especially subsequent judges on the same court, to 
be principled in the sense that they will attempt to decide based on 
reasoned elaboration of established constitutional and other judicial 
norms rather than current political preferences.197 That behavior will 
make it more likely that the gains secured by the self-dealing judges 
will remain in place.198 Both sets of judges likely recognize that there 
are strong temptations away from the type of principled decisions 
just mentioned. I catalogued those temptations earlier: they include 
the possibility of reward from outsiders and ideological, practical, or 
political sympathy with political actors.  
 Again, institutional ideology is potentially a powerful remedy for 
the temptations of rational self-interest. By institutional ideology, I 
mean a kind of secular dharma, a code of behavior for individuals in 
particular roles within the institution.199 The ideology works from 
both within and without. Social psychology demonstrates it is shame-
ful and painful for human beings to disappoint behavioral expecta-
tions, as anyone who has shown up underdressed for a popular social 
event can likely attest.200 Similarly, a widely shared view about how 
Regulator X should behave creates social pressure on X to conform.201 
Role norms have a sort of momentum; observing repeated behavior 
builds expectations that it will continue, which in turn strengthens 
pressure on the observed to keep doing what he or she was doing.202 
                                                                                                                      
 197. In using the term “principled,” I have in mind something akin to Dworkin’s notion 
of principled interpretation. DWORKIN, supra note 169, at 219-24. But my argument is also 
open to the possibility that courts will frame “principled” interpretations more loosely. As I 
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implies, see infra note 287. 
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Several studies also show that how behavior is observed and re-
peated also matters. For example, “rituals” are especially powerful 
ways of reinforcing role expectations, perhaps because they are un-
derstood as defining features of a given role.203 Thus, ceremonies of 
manhood have real impact on altering the behavior of adolescent 
boys, and the “trappings” and ceremony of government power rein-
force typical behavior by the governors.204 Over time, role-appropriate 
behavior becomes not only a response to outside stimuli but also an 
internalized norm, as Regulator X comes to share public expecta-
tions, practices them, and desires to conform.205 Thus, taking the oath 
of office not only exposes her to outside pressure that she will fulfill 
the norms of her office, but also makes her want to fulfill them.  
 We therefore can see judicial rhetoric as an implement for shaping 
and reinforcing an ideology of judging.206 The ethos emerges most ex-
plicitly when the role of judges is most directly at issue. Begin with 
the master craftsman, Chief Justice Marshall. He proclaims not only 
that judges can and should interpret the Constitution, but also, “It is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say 
what the law is.”207 Another fine example is Justice Harlan’s famous 
opinion in Sparf v. United States, a case in which the petitioners had 
challenged the rule that they could not argue the lawfulness of their 
conduct to the jury.208 The Court rejected their claim, holding that 
lawmaking is the province of the court alone: 
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 208. 156 U.S. 51, 62-64 (1895). 
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Upon the Court rests the responsibility of declaring the law . . .  
Under any other system, the courts, although established in order 
to declare the law, would for every practical purpose be eliminated 
from our system of government as instrumentalities devised for 
the protection equally of society and of individuals in their essen-
tial rights. When that occurs our government will cease to be a 
government of laws, and become a government of men. Liberty 
regulated by law is the underlying principle of our institutions.209 
Again, Harlan explicitly identifies the rule of law and defiance of self-
dealing as a “responsibility” of judging. He raises the stakes even 
higher by implying that if judges fail in that responsibility, ordered 
society itself would collapse.  
 Framed by these direct explanations and call to arms, the rhetoric 
of principled decisionmaking stakes out a similar claim, although 
typically far more implicitly. By justifying case after case based not 
upon the personal preference of the judge, but rather by reference to 
reasoned elaboration of constitutional principle and existing prece-
dent, judicial rhetoric builds a norm of judicial operation, an expected 
mode of functioning that other judges should not shirk.210 That be-
comes “what courts do.”211 The language of legal reasoning generally, 
with its arcane terms of art, gratuitous Latin, and generally alien 
structure to popular thinking, constructs itself as a “science” suitable 
only for specialists.212 That distinctive language and process helps to 
sharpen the definition of the judicial role as something “other,” as re-
quiring a mode of thinking and behaving distinct from ordinary po-
litical thought. All of these features help to reinforce our baseline ex-
pectation, set up by the structure of the Article III judiciary, that 
federal judges will be less receptive to political influence. In fact, as 
early as 1834, James Madison argued that the tone of judicial opin-
ions—the “gravity and deliberations of their proceedings,” as well as 
the “qualities implied in [the Court’s] members” by its structure—
was a significant factor underlying the Court’s authority.213  
 And so Supreme Court rhetoric can operate in several different 
ways to constrain the behavior of the Justices. The first is somewhat 
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outward looking; it sets up popular opinion, which creates social 
pressure.214 Judicial rhetoric may also raise the pressure the mem-
bers of the Supreme Court community place on each other to live up 
to the norms of their words. Finally, the rhetoric of principle may 
have an effect similar to Aristotle’s notion of the practice of virtue: 
over time, even pretending to be virtuous may lead us to become 
what we pretend.215 Aristotle would have said the transformation 
arises out of habit; a modern psychologist might say the transforma-
tion would reduce cognitive dissonance.216  
 Another important audience for judicial rhetoric is other judicial 
actors. Consider the difficulty of controlling doctrinal developments 
in a system with sixty-three intermediate courts (or more, depending 
on whether one wants to count state intermediate courts) authorized 
to interpret federal law.217 Given the practical difficulties of direct 
supervision and the considerable lag time that attends even direct 
error correction, the most useful limitation on lower courts is proba-
bly the lower courts’ sense of obligation to follow existing precedent. 
Rhetoric thus becomes an important control method in encouraging 
lower courts interpreting federal law to abide by principles laid down 
by the Supreme Court. Superior courts can also use shame to make 
lower courts’ desire to avoid reversal more intense—for example, by 
not only reversing but also castigating the lower court for being un-
principled or failing to follow clear precedent. Similarly, rhetoric 
might also be aimed at future Supreme Court Justices, in the hopes 
that they will come to the Court already having internalized the 
norms laid down by their predecessors, or, in joining the Court, as-
pire to achieve the norm of their new community. That would, again, 
likely lead to a more robust sense of precedent, which would allow 
present Justices to have longer-lasting impact on the law.  
 Claims of judicial exclusivity might play a substantial role in rein-
forcing the psychological impact of judicial rhetoric. Social psychology 
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tells us that roles, and the norms that accompany them, are often de-
fined by contrast.218 Role definition is especially powerful when mem-
bership is highlighted by comparison to an “other,” especially an in-
ferior other.219 Because most people desire superior status, generally, 
people prefer to act in the way that defines the higher role rather 
than the lower.220 Thus, a perception of membership in an “elite” 
class strengthens feelings of cohesion and increases the likelihood of 
compliance with the norms of the “elite” group.221  
 Rhetorical claims of exclusive judicial authority to interpret the 
Constitution can function in this way. The Court defines its decisions 
as special or principled, and popular or political determinations as a 
lesser mode, unprincipled, amoral, untrustworthy, dangerous, and 
destabilizing.222 Take the Court’s opinion in Boerne itself.223 In reject-
ing Congress’s efforts to control the level of scrutiny state courts ac-
corded burdens on religious freedom, the Court invoked Marbury to 
suggest that such power would be the equivalent of letting Congress 
amend the Constitution. The Court explained: “If Congress could de-
fine its own powers by altering the Fourteenth Amendment’s mean-
ing, no longer would the Constitution be ‘superior paramount law, 
unchangeable by ordinary means.’ It would be ‘on a level with ordi-
nary legislative acts, and, like other acts, . . . alterable when the leg-
islature shall please to alter it.’ ”224 Consider the Court’s use of the 
Marbury language here. Constitutional law is “superior” and “para-
mount,” and not, as the Court tells us twice, “ordinary” in the way 
that everyday lawmaking is ordinary. Implicitly, then, constitutional 
interpretation is different, higher, and better than politics.225 The 
body that has exclusive power to make this “superior” kind of law 
must itself be elite, and we should aspire to emulate its norms.  
 Exclusivity might also be required by a self-conscious use of rheto-
ric to elevate the importance of judicial constitutional interpretation 
at the expense of “ordinary” politics. The self-conscious rhetoritician 
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should recognize that building the status of courts diminishes the 
status of other policymaking institutions. One consequence may 
therefore be less principled behavior in those institutions. Thus, if 
the Court wants to prevent unprincipled constitutional interpreta-
tion, it may well want to prohibit such interpretation by the branches 
whose capacity it has undercut.  
 This last point implies one significant problem with rhetorical 
claims of exclusivity. Critics of exclusivity argue that one of its most 
significant costs is that it may degrade the quality of constitutional 
deliberation by nonjudicial actors.226 As I have just described, rhe-
torical justifications of exclusivity is an important mechanism for 
how that might occur; rhetorical exclusivity lowers public and inter-
nal expectations of the political branches’ capacity for principled in-
terpretation, including in their purely internal deliberations. That 
should be a concern at least for public-minded courts. 
 More problematic still, neither of the above uses justify exclusive 
judicial authority over all of constitutional law. Contrasting constitu-
tional interpretation with ordinary politics does strengthen the role-
defining force of judicial rhetoric, but so, presumably, would contrast-
ing a subset of constitutional law. Why couldn’t the Court highlight a 
handful of rights, or portions of rights, that involve fundamental and 
compelling moral judgments, or highly elusive second-order prefer-
ences, and contrast only those select handful with everyday policy? 
Indeed, the Court’s rhetorical claim that its exclusive constitutional 
realm is “superior” and “paramount” would seem a little ridiculous 
when that realm includes age limitations for federal officials, proce-
dures for filling a vacant Vice Presidency, Congress’s power to estab-
lish post roads, and other similarly quotidian constitutional sub-
jects.227 Of course, one might argue that what makes constitutional 
law so unique is the special processes for its enactment, the wide, 
popular agreement it requires, the corresponding likelihood that it 
represents deep public commitments, and so on.228 My point, though, 
is that we could plausibly offer similar unifying stories for less com-
prehensive subsets of the Constitution, or even for groupings of legal 
interpretation that span constitutional and statutory interpretation.  
If that is the case, given the costs of exclusivity, including its effect 
on internal deliberation by other branches, why not choose an exclu-
sive sphere that also allows some room for nonjudicial interpreters, 
and that credits politics with some ability to make principled choices? 
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Then the realms drawn out for shared interpretation would mitigate 
the risk that judges would contribute to a downward spiral of both 
internal and external expectations for political reasoning in those ar-
eas.  
 This examination of the particular institutional needs of the judi-
ciary therefore seems to turn up at least a partial justification for a 
rule of exclusivity. Although what I have called “traditional” justifi-
cations for claims of judicial authority do not support exclusivity, it is 
possible that exclusivity could be a strong component in constituting 
an ideology of principled judging. But even there the argument for 
exclusivity is incomplete; it suggests that although we might want 
some field of the law to be exclusive to judges, that field would not 
have to encompass all of constitutional law. Nor does the notion of an 
ideology-reinforcing rhetorical claim of exclusivity by itself seem to 
explain how or where the line of exclusivity should be drawn. 
Whether such a line can be drawn, and if so how, is the main subject 
of the next Part.  
VI.   VIVE LE BOERNE? 
 It now seems that there is no compelling justification for exclusive 
judicial authority over constitutional meaning and no rationale for 
judicial review that cannot be distinguished when is it applied to ex-
clusivity. Perhaps then we could say that Boerne simply mistakes 
Klein supremacy for an antidepartmentalism principle.229 But in 
fairness to exclusivists, exclusive judicial control of the whole of the 
Constitution may be something of a straw man position. Boerne, after 
all, does allow Congress to “enforce” the Constitution.230 As I have ar-
gued, that power sweeps in much that in a realist sense is constitu-
tional interpretation. If a present Supreme Court is to give Boerne 
the respect it can claim as extant precedent, and our argument is di-
rected to that Court, we likely must also explore the possibility that 
there is a principled account of Boerne that explains its actual ef-
fect—a regime that, while nominally entirely exclusive, in fact ex-
cludes Congress only from portions of the task of constitutional in-
terpretation.  
 We have to make this inquiry not only out of deference to the 
stare decisis value of Boerne, but also because of the significance of 
the psychological rhetorical aspect of exclusivity. Recall that one of 
the framing questions at the outset of this Article was whether there 
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were any aspects of Merryman and Klein supremacy (which we ac-
cepted as highly entrenched) that we would have difficulty disentan-
gling from an antidepartmentalist principle. Rhetorical demands, we 
just saw, do seem important to the operation of judicial review, if not 
essential components of it. While rhetoric does not require complete 
exclusivity, it implies a significant role for at least partial exclusivity. 
The question now seems to be whether the competing concerns that 
support departmentalism can allow occasional exceptions, or if they 
would outweigh the benefits rhetoric may offer judicial review. In the 
remainder of this Part, I consider whether partial exclusivity can 
withstand the difficulties I have already outlined.  
 First, partial judicial exclusivity seems to resist the criticisms of 
collaborative interpretation.231 Although partial exclusivity is distinct 
from most notions of collaboration, it nonetheless could accrue many 
of the same benefits. Leaving at least a portion of a right open to po-
litical development can give the court an opportunity to gather in-
formation about how the right works in different settings and ob-
serve innovative approaches to balancing and securing the right over 
time and in various communities. To take a very simple example, 
suppose a court reserved for itself the meaning of discrimination 
based on race but allowed political development of the time period for 
filing complaints. The ways that different jurisdictions choose to bal-
ance vindication of the right with interests of notice and repose for 
defendants could give that court insight into how it might balance 
the right against more significant interests of greater constitutional 
dimension, as well as a measure of the current moral status of the 
antidiscrimination right in each jurisdiction over time. Even that 
minor experiment can give the judiciary data on important questions, 
such as whether the affected communities slowly accept the right 
and elevate it over other factors or whether they find that there is 
dwindling need for its enforcement. Partial exclusivity similarly 
leaves in place another advantage collaboration offers for “getting 
rights right” that we thought would be lost with total exclusivity. If 
agencies can elaborate on some rights some of the time, they would 
allow courts to utilize remedial measures ordinarily unavailable to 
them, and more generally to extend at least in part the courts’ capac-
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ity to protect rights by piggy backing on the agency’s rights interpre-
tation and enforcement.232  
 Settlement, too, may have some value if enforced only in a few 
constitutional areas. In fact, settlement seems somewhat more co-
herent as a judicial strategy when it is invoked selectively. Although 
settlement obviously represents an important set of values, it is hard 
to accept why it should be the single preeminent value.233 A partial 
exclusivity could be modulated to preserve finality of judicial deci-
sions in those areas where settlement seems to outweigh other con-
siderations, as where the underlying right is very controversial, so 
that further “percolation” would be more divisive and wasteful than 
useful, or where those who are protected by the right are very de-
pendent on its predictability. For example, as others have observed, 
criminal defendants (and potential defendants) are especially vul-
nerable to weakening of the rule of law, so that perhaps criminal 
trial rights and the like should have some zone that is not prone to 
evolution.234  
 Remember also that I argued earlier that allowing agencies to in-
terpret on a “blank slate,” or in areas of novel application, could com-
bine some of the merits of experimentation with some incremental 
legal stability. In the end I rejected that possibility as inconsistent 
with a commitment to maximal stability. But if we viewed settlement 
as one among several values, whose importance varied depending 
upon the context of the right being stabilized, we might in many in-
stances be willing to accept the difficulties of distinguishing between 
different acceptable modes in exchange for the greater flexibility they 
offer.  
 For similar reasons, criticism of the settlement function is less bit-
ing once there is no need to establish that settlement is superior to 
any other value. Exclusivity, as discussed above, may not actually be 
that settling, because relatively small amounts of disobedience can 
snowball, and in many cases exclusivity will only submerge debate 
about values under a layer of technobabble. These are serious con-
cerns for an absolute claim of exclusivity, which has to establish the 
preeminence of stability over all conditions despite obvious rigidity 
costs. But they are easier to accommodate when settlement is only a 
factor to be balanced in deciding whether to make a particular right 
or portion of a right exclusive to the judiciary; in some instances the 
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lessened settlement will still be enough (perhaps along with other 
considerations) to merit exclusivity, but in many other instances it 
will not. It may be that settlement will offer a justification for exclu-
sivity, even in combination with other factors, only when it appears 
that ordinary judicial review will not adequately settle the law.  
 On the other hand, the relative malleability of partial exclusivity 
may be a problem for the rhetorical-psychological uses of exclusivity. 
In order for exclusivity to function as a rhetorical tool for defining ju-
dicial ideology, it must define that ideology relatively coherently. In 
the abstract, one supposes, it might be possible for strongly embed-
ded and reinforced but illogical traditions to persist over time. Maybe 
for a time some cultures could accept judicial claims that interpreta-
tion from 9:15 to 11:15 a.m. each morning is special, or that argu-
ments considered after inhaling the smoke billowing from a hot 
spring on an Aegean isle are of particular status that demand a par-
ticular mode of behavior. But role definition is an accumulation of 
expectations. We frame our expectations with what we already 
know.235 A tradition that explains itself coherently and convincingly, 
that accords with an existing sense of the world, of logic, and of jus-
tice, is more likely to ring true with its audience, and in turn more 
likely to take root and remain persuasive over time.236 Certainly at 
least in a modern, Western, post-Enlightenment culture there is an 
expectation that justifications for public policy must be grounded in 
reason.237 And, for the most part, Dworkin is right when he says that 
our expectation of reason also entails an expectation of consistency 
and a hostility to what he calls “checkerboard” solutions—in my ex-
ample, the illogic of 9:15 a.m.238  
 Further, the fact that the goal of establishing a judicial ideology is 
to instill a desire for principled decisionmaking may demand a prin-
cipled definition of the scope of that ideology. An act of principled in-
terpretation often begins not with the four corners of the individual 
question presented, but with an analysis of the role of the interpreter 
within his interpretive community.239 In other words, in the ideology 
we are hoping will arise, judges will begin their task by asking, “Am I 
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the kind of person who is bound by the kinds of obligations that 
judges have, and what does that set of obligations require of me in 
this case?” If that task is fouled up at its outset by problems of inco-
herent or unprincipled dividing lines between what is or is not privi-
leged and principled, then judges’ confidence in the definition and in 
their mission will weaken. That may make the whole endeavor im-
possible in the long run.  
 So the question for partial exclusivity becomes whether it is possi-
ble to draw a principled or coherent line other than by declaring that 
“it is a constitution we are expounding.”240 That line, I have said, has 
some weaknesses, but also has the considerable strength that it ap-
peals to the notion of courts as the faithful agents of the ancient au-
thors of a uniquely authoritative text. At the same time, a workable 
partial exclusivity could be sustained with another line, perhaps one 
that begins by asserting that there is a divide between ordinary dif-
ferences of opinion and disputes about fundamental matters of value. 
We might offer any one of several fairly coherent distinctions be-
tween the two, as perhaps a libertarian ideal of individual auton-
omy,241 Rawls’s suggestion that a fundamental value is one that 
should not be subject to majority preference,242 or Dworkin’s some-
what correlative claim that fundamental rights are in the main those 
required by equal regard for all individuals.243 The problem with 
these examples is that taken alone they would also extend to many 
statutes. That produces a logical difficulty: How can a court claim 
that it alone can interpret the proper scope of a right when that right 
is embedded within a policy that was initially established by the very 
body the court will claim is not an authoritative interpreter of the 
right? Would the entire enactment be void?  
 Partial exclusivity might avoid this dilemma by combining the two 
rationales: courts should preserve those fundamental principles es-
tablished by a diverse, numerous, and highly activated past body 
politic. For example, we could say that “what courts do” uniquely is 
to elaborate the “thin” Constitution.244 We could further claim that it 
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is the definition of these rights that is most fundamental. As the in-
terpreter moves from considering the “core” rights to evaluating how 
the right relates to real-world policies, her decision departs from the 
unique authority of the judiciary and becomes more like “thick” con-
stitutional choices about more quotidian policy decisions.245  
 Many might object that this resolution is unsatisfying because it 
seems arbitrarily to omit some portions of the Constitution. The 
choices of which values are “higher” and worthy of special protection 
might seem arbitrary, or at least subjective.246 The same would be 
true of claims about what decisions courts are most “competent” to 
make—again, competency can not be defined in the abstract, de-
tached from subjective measures of good or effective outcomes.247 In 
contrast, faithful agency to the whole of the document offers a 
straightforward rhetorical claim to producing “right” answers, in the 
sense that the question of the document’s meaning is basically an ob-
jective historical question.248 But, pace Scalia and St. Augustine, his-
torical interpretations of texts are subjective encounters between the 
interpreter’s values and the semantic possibilities of the text and 
meta-text.249 In any event, partial exclusivity does not need to conclu-
sively reject originalism or faith in constitutional “right” answers. It 
need only show that either view—originalist or deconstructionist—is 
internally consistent and therefore capable of sustaining a principled 
judicial ideology. There is nothing in this critique that would suggest 
otherwise.  
 Another possible objection is that the dividing line between what 
is exclusive and what is not, under any proposed subset of the Con-
stitution, will rarely be bright. Perhaps, this argument goes, that un-
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certainty will weaken or even fatally undermine the definition of the 
judicial role. It is important to recognize, though, that the possibility 
of principled disagreement at the margins of judicial authority is not 
the same as incoherence in the definition itself. Principled interpre-
tation can survive disagreement about difficult cases without un-
dermining the force of the underlying principles.250 In most cases, the 
lines will be clear, and in those where it is not, judges will still be 
able to recognize the liminal decision they are making as one that is 
consistent with the overall project of the judicial ideology. Further-
more, the line between “constitutional” cases and all others is not 
necessarily that bright either.251 Recall again our discussion of new 
applications, modes of enforcement, and so on. Are these “constitu-
tional” questions? Probably so, but sometimes it will not be easy to 
say for sure.  
 In addition, there are significant advantages to having a line that 
is not terribly clear. Having a bright line would make more work for 
the Court in striking down efforts to evade its exclusivity require-
ments. The brightness of the line would make it more likely that eva-
sions would be recognizable as evasions and, for the sake of judicial 
credibility, demand judicial response. Economizing on judicial invali-
dation might extend judicial capacity to do other countermajoritarian 
work.252 Blurry lines also probably have a stronger deterrent effect, 
because an agency that does not want to waste its efforts will not 
want to venture into the “DMZ” on the borders of exclusivity unless it 
is strongly committed to an outcome that requires the trip.253 That, 
too, economizes the Court’s efforts. Leaving a bit of uncertainty also 
reduces the amount of dirt that the Court, by elevating its own status 
in the privileged area, throws on the capacity of other branches to 
engage in that form of constitutional reasoning. Since such reasoning 
is probably inevitable in some internal, largely unreviewable deci-
sions by the political branches, it would be better to leave open as 
much ground as is consistent with the Court’s obligation to itself.254  
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 Finally, partial exclusivity can likely also claim to make a portion 
of the traditional Bickelian understanding of exclusivist judicial 
rhetoric more persuasive. Recall that the basic problem with that 
view was that in entailing a very extensive zone of exclusivity, it 
called for an overextension of the judicial efforts it aimed at econo-
mizing, and left judges with no effective way to resolve some of the 
rights dilemmas it was aimed at resolving. Certainly to the extent 
that exclusivity was a component of a judicial claim that courts reach 
“right” answers or can alone find the one meaning the authors of the 
Constitution intended, partial exclusivity is no help. That claim is 
not really consistent with judicial tolerance for experimentation with 
the scope or implementation of the underlying right.255 But even par-
tial exclusivity could still buttress the Court that says that its bal-
ancing on some particularly fundamental constitutional rights has a 
special claim of moral authority. Exclusivity even in select aspects of 
certain rights would provide the Court an a cappella voice to lead or 
persuade in that area.  
 In sum, partial exclusivity, at least in the abstract, looks fairly re-
sistant to the criticisms aimed at exclusivity generally. It is reasona-
bly consistent with Boerne’s doctrinal line—“enforcement” or “pro-
phylactic remedies” might describe the margins of where a funda-
mental rights definition begins to drift into rights instantiation.256 
And it actually seems to support some of the goals of judicial review: 
strengthening the judiciary’s institutional commitment to preserving 
rights; preserving a powerful moral voice for the Court in resolving 
difficult questions of justice in balance; and helping the Court to get 
some fundamental questions right and settle them rightly. Still, 
there are two important questions remaining. How does executive 
involvement affect this analysis? And can the vague concept of prin-
cipled partial exclusivity work in practice? The next two Parts hash 
these questions out. 
VII.   AGENCIES, BUT NOT CONGRESS? 
 Until now, although I have mostly discussed executive action, 
many of my points seemingly could apply equally well to Congress as 
they do to interpretations issued by an agency. The reader may rea-
sonably wonder why, then, I chose at the outset to frame my discus-
sion in terms of a rule of administrative law rather than more gener-
ally addressing the question of extrajudicial interpretation. The an-
swer, as I explain in this Part, is that there are in fact some signifi-
cant differences between how courts relate to agencies and how 
courts relate to Congress. Probably the largest difference appears in 
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an explanation for exclusivity we have not yet considered. I describe 
it here as “agenda limitation.” Courts may restrict the authority of 
other entities to interpret the Constitution so that courts alone have 
control over some aspects of the national agenda, or over with what 
issues the courts will be forced to grapple. As I argued in an earlier 
work, the argument for excluding agencies on these bases is much 
weaker than the argument for excluding Congress.257 Because these 
points have been discussed at length elsewhere, my treatment of 
them here is fairly cursory. In Part VII.B., I try to explain what may 
at first seem an oddity: that agencies, which supposedly exercise 
power delegated to them by Congress, should at times be able to in-
terpret the Constitution when the legislature cannot. 
A.   Agenda Limitation 
 The Court’s opinion in Boerne devotes exactly one sentence to the 
issue of federalism.258 Plainly, though, the Court’s ruling has impor-
tant implications for the federal government’s ability to displace 
state or private ordering with national norms.259 That suspicion was 
confirmed in a number of cases following Boerne, where Boerne’s 
limitations on Congress’s power to “enforce” the Fourteenth Amend-
ment proved the final line of defense against congressional efforts to 
remove state sovereign immunity260 or expand entitlements for the 
disempowered.261 By reserving for itself exclusive power to control the 
scope of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court was able to reduce 
Congress’s ability to nationalize its policy goals.262 Put another way, 
judicial enforcement of federalism values may be a justification for 
exclusivity at least over rights that might tend to expand the power 
of the federal government at the expense of states.  
 In another work I have argued that judges generally do not need 
to prevent agencies from trammeling on the values of federalism.263 
Judicially enforced federalism is not aimed simply at constraining 
national lawmaking. If it were, then one would expect identical limi-
tations on legislation under both Section 5 and the Necessary and 
Proper Clause. Instead, the Court’s concern is mainly with legislation 
where it perceives some flaw in the political process that would inter-
fere with the accountability of federal and state officials for their re-
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spective decisions over time.264 I contend, however, that the nature of 
the relationship between regulated states and regulating agencies is 
such that there is not much danger that the state will lose autonomy 
or that its voters will be unable to hold the correct officeholder re-
sponsible for bad or undesirable outcomes.265 States, especially states 
holding a national minority position, are especially powerful admin-
istrative lobbyists.266 Voters correctly hold both state and national po-
licymakers to account when a cooperative venture goes sour.267 And 
crucially, relationships between agencies and states can be designed 
in ways that enhance transparency, activate voters, and give states a 
powerful voice in both the goals and implementation of national pro-
grams.268  
 It might be argued that (somewhat paradoxically for a proponent 
of unalloyed exclusivity) exclusive agenda control is a necessary inci-
dent of a more generally experimentalist regime of constitutional in-
terpretation. For example, Professor Dorf has suggested that the Su-
preme Court could use federalism in the Brandeisian sense, prohibit-
ing national legislative solutions so that states can experiment with 
a variety of alternative approaches to the same sets of rights ques-
tions.269 One weakness of this proposal is that the judiciary alone is 
unlikely to be able to sort out the varying results in a way that pro-
duces genuinely better outcomes. Indeed, in his other writings Dorf 
prefers a refereed experimentalism, in which some central political 
authority can collate all the data that the various experimenters pro-
duce, analyze it, offer benchmarks for comparison, suggest best prac-
tices for emulation, help to develop incentives for the participants to 
achieve yet better outcomes, and provide overall policy guidance 
about the goals of the experiment.270 In correspondence with this au-
thor, Professor Dorf agreed that he would qualify his exclusivity ar-
gument with the addition that, if either Congress or an agency were 
going to serve this centralizing function, the Court should not pro-
hibit its interpretations.271 
 But it seems far more likely that agencies, not Congress (and cer-
tainly not courts) are best equipped to carry out that function. Agen-
cies already have the diversified national bureaucracy, experience in 
continually revising standards to match rules (and vice versa), con-
                                                                                                                      
 264. Id. at 220-22. 
 265. Id. at 222. 
 266. Id. at 194-95, 222. 
 267. Id. at 200-02. 
 268. Id. at 196. 
 269. Dorf, supra note 10, at 9, 60-61, 64-65. 
 270. See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimen-
talism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 314, 321 (1998). 
 271. Email from Michael Dorf, Professor of Law, Columbia Law School, to author (Oct. 
26, 2004, 22:06:04 EST) (on file with author). 
2005]                       JUSTICE OF ADMINISTRATION 219 
 
trol over sources of state revenue, and other tools that would be use-
ful for the task.272 Agencies deal with day-to-day problems of admini-
stration; therefore, their information is current and closer to “the 
ground.”273 Of course, over time Congress might (if it had the inclina-
tion) develop some similar skills and attributes. But the more fun-
damental point is that in the end Congress’s binding authority issues 
only through legislation, which is difficult to enact, whereas agencies 
have a choice of many more nuanced tools for furthering their 
goals.274 That characteristic produces a large difference in inertia and 
attentiveness to ongoing concerns.275 Congress is often slack and slow 
to respond, while agencies are more nimble.276  
 There is a similar explanation for why agencies are also consid-
erably less affected by another form of agenda control. One explana-
tion for Boerne and other complementary Court decisions is that the 
Court is sometimes reluctant to assume authority over highly con-
troversial or factually difficult litigation.277 By limiting the extent to 
which other actors can define legal rights, the Court can shortcut ef-
forts to force it to confront constitutional dilemmas it would rather 
avoid. These concerns seem fairly reasonable for rights-defining leg-
islation. Legislative inertia might often leave the Court to resolve the 
most difficult technical problems or impose on the Court the burden 
of taking responsibility for a controversial outcome. In contrast, 
“[t]he day-to-day involvement of federal agencies in overseeing 
[rights-defining regulation] gives courts the benefit of the agency’s 
technical expertise, and assures that the courts will have a politically 
accountable partner in elaborating the meaning of statutes that fur-
ther constitutional values.”278  
 Thus, even in a regime that for the most part did not accept exclu-
sivity on other bases, the judiciary might be reluctant to allow some 
forms of constitutional interpretation and definition by Congress that 
it would not prohibit to an agency. Likewise, within a partially exclu-
sive system, the judiciary might allow agencies more leeway to pon-
der and define rights than it would permit Congress. 
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B.   Non-Nondelegation? 
 If we accept these sets of arguments, we may be left with what 
may seem like an odd result. With the exception perhaps of a handful 
of special presidential powers, the Executive typically operates only 
within the scope of a statutory delegation of power from Congress.279 
In effect, though, I have argued that the Executive should be able to 
exercise some authority that Congress cannot. How can Congress 
give someone else power it does not have itself? One correspondent 
colorfully described this view of my argument as the “non-
nondelegation doctrine.” 
 The problem of non-nondelegation (to adopt a felicitous phrase) is 
an illusion brought on by the linguistic habits of formalism. Congress 
does not really grant power to the executive. Instead, administrative 
law limits each branch’s exercise of power according to a set of policy 
judgments about which allocation of those powers would best accord 
with the design of the Constitution. When we say that an agency acts 
ultra vires if it goes beyond what Congress could reasonably have 
contemplated in its grant of authority,280 we actually are making a 
judgment that allowing the agency to act more freely would threaten 
to unleash executive power from the constraints imposed by having 
also to satisfy the choices of a more diversely and locally selected 
governmental body (that is, Congress). To say that Congress granted 
or gave the agency its power is just a shorthand way of saying that 
agency action in that particular instance comports with our notion of 
how divided government should function. Perhaps the issue would be 
clearer if the resulting arrangement was called “reallocation” instead 
of delegation. 
 Thus, it is irrelevant whether Congress could itself exercise a 
power that it “delegates” to another body. The real question is 
whether exercise of the power by the delegate is consistent with the 
competing interests demanded by separation of powers theory. If 
these practical reasons suggest that it would be unwise for Congress 
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to utilize a power, but that with Congress’s consent the Executive 
can safely do so, what is the problem with “delegation”? To see a 
plain example of this phenomenon, consider the Ex Post Facto 
Clause.281 Congress cannot constitutionally impose liability or in-
crease punishment for an offense after it has been committed.282 
Courts, however, in interpreting a congressional statute, can read 
the law in a way that results in new liabilities or increased after-the-
fact exposure.283 Yet we could easily say that the power to interpret a 
statute is a form of delegation.284 Nonetheless, judicial interpretation 
does not contravene the Ex Post Facto Clause, largely because it is 
not thought to threaten the kind of vindictive or abusive majoritari-
anism that legislative enactments would, and because the judicial 
system would have difficulty functioning otherwise.285 No one com-
plains that Congress has given courts a power it cannot itself utilize. 
This Article, I submit, engages in the same form of functional analy-
sis.  
 In short, there is nothing about agencies that would support a 
presumption that Congress would not wish to delegate to them con-
stitutional interpretive authority. Furthermore, interpretation by 
agencies offers courts several advantages generally not available 
when the interpretive partner is Congress. 
VIII.   A METHOD AND TWO EXAMPLES 
 At this stage, two things seem clear—and, I fear, several other 
things may appear anything but. The points of clarity are these: 
there seem to be good arguments in favor of a modest zone of exclu-
sive judicial interpretation, but there is no real case for a blanket 
presumption that agencies have not been “delegated” the power to in-
terpret the Constitution generally. Even if the strength of the partial 
exclusivity position is accepted, it is not obvious (to say the least) 
where to draw the borders of exclusivity. I do not propose an answer 
to that problem here. This Part, however, lays out, based on what I 
have discussed so far, how a court might conduct the exclusivity 
analysis in any particular instance. In other words, this Part tries to 
reformulate the Boerne rule and the meaning of “arbitrary and capri-
cious” for use in the review of agency action. Because any rule of this 
complexity will be hard to grasp in the abstract, I then apply the 
proposed rule to two doctrinal areas of particular interest to me: fed-
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eral “disparate impact” regulations under Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 and IRS regulation of the political activities of non-
profits. 
A.   The Method 
 As the psychology of regulation suggests, there may be an impor-
tant role for partial judicial exclusivity. By itself, though, social psy-
chological analysis tells us little about which areas of constitutional 
doctrine should be exclusive to the judiciary. It is also hard to predict 
in advance just how large a zone of exclusivity courts will need to 
proclaim. As with more traditional theories of rhetoric, the force and 
frequency of rhetorical claims might be lowered if the public promi-
nence of the declarations is higher. Exclusivity might end up being a 
matter of a gestalt intuition, managed by the Court across many doc-
trinal lines. Powerful claims of exclusivity in some prominent cases 
might reduce the need for exclusivity in others. Under this view, any 
effort to systematize exclusivity or reduce it to meaningful doctrine 
looks difficult and perhaps inconsistent with an optimal balancing of 
exclusivity with other desirable judicial goals.  
 This dilemma is a familiar one. In any given case that comes be-
fore a court, techniques such as avoidance and minimalist interpreta-
tion present the court with a difficult choice between doing its per-
ceived duty in the individual case and preserving its future capacity 
for later cases.286 Since this calculus might depend on existing, and 
even remotely anticipated, conditions in other doctrinal areas, it 
would be almost impossible to formulate in a principled way the con-
ditions under which a court will actually confront an issue and when 
it will avoid or minimize it. The court will have a further choice 
about how candid it should be about its reasons for the resulting de-
cision. 
 The social-psychological explanation for exclusivity may avoid this 
set of problems. Psychological exclusivity depends on a claim that 
judges interpret in a “principled” way. It, therefore, demands that 
the limits of where the obligations of principle attach themselves be 
defined consistently with the interpreter’s interior values, whatever 
their precise content.287 Thus, a judge following that philosophy 
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would have to choose those cases in which she was obliged to apply or 
defend her underlying values (that is, obligated not to avoid or share 
interpretation) according to reasoned elaboration from those values. 
Reasoned elaboration of determinate problems produces “right” an-
swers—a range of possible results that can logically be inferred from 
a particular set of premises.288 Of course, not all exclusivity questions 
will be determinate, but at least in some cases, reasoned elaboration 
of the competing arguments for and against judicial exclusivity over 
a particular legal issue will yield an answer. In those cases, it will be 
difficult for the judge to set aside the principled answer in favor of 
other considerations. She has to have rules and to follow them.289  
 In short, the social-psychological exclusivist judge must establish 
a rule for selecting when to invoke exclusivity and instruct that the 
Court follow that rule faithfully. The exact content of any set of rules 
will vary depending on the court’s choice of values. But we have al-
ready seen in Part VI the framework for laying out those values.  
 To summarize, the court’s choice works out to a balancing be-
tween the benefits of shared interpretation and exclusivity. Shared 
interpretation is often better informed, generates more public good 
will, may encourage nonjudicial constitutional deliberation, and is 
more likely to reflect current preferences. These are formidable ad-
vantages, especially when supplemented with carefully designed, but 
nonexclusive, judicial review. But for some issues public considera-
tion may not be very useful, as where honest public deliberation is 
unlikely or distorted. Exclusivity might help to clear the field for ju-
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dicial moral leadership or to strengthen judicial appeals to substra-
tum moral commitments that run contrary to the results of political 
contests. Settlement might be appealing enough in some cases to 
merit some exclusive judicial role, especially if the usual downside of 
exclusivity is mitigated by a region of shared interpretation on re-
lated issues, so that the court can distribute responsibility and re-
ceive ongoing feedback about its choices. Finally, we should give 
some heed whether the court needs to use exclusivity for agenda-
limitation, although that consideration is not very important when it 
is an agency that is responsible for the interpretation.  
 Judicial role definition is also putatively an important benefit of 
partial exclusivity. In a sense, social-psychological considerations are 
a component of any consistently applied balancing test, because ab-
sent the demands of role definition we might be tempted to abandon 
consistent application in favor of a more flexible Bickelian model. 
But, to the extent that principled balancing alone does not ade-
quately weigh judicial rolebuilding, that factor could be used as a tie-
breaker. Ad hoc judgments about the need for more, or more visible, 
claims of exclusivity could not fit comfortably in an ostensibly princi-
pled balancing. But where there are relatively evenly balanced ques-
tions of exclusivity, the judge’s principled test is indeterminate. 
Thus, it would still be consistent with the goals of exclusivity to tip 
one way or the other depending on the court’s gestalt sense of 
whether more or less exclusivity was needed to firm up its image.  
 There are two other significant considerations that the test would 
likely have to account for. First, we would have to ask whether any of 
the purposes of exclusivity could be fulfilled more effectively with the 
tools of judicial review. For example, Boerne’s “congruence and pro-
portionality” requirement290 may at times accomplish some of the 
goals of exclusivity, even where the Court ultimately decides that 
Congress was acting within its Section 5 power. A congressional or 
agency obligation to analyze in detail the history of the “unconstitu-
tional” practices it is targeting can serve the same moral leadership 
function as an exclusive judicial declaration of principle, in that it too 
would focus public attention on a problem and encourage informed 
deliberation about the problem’s content. Agency deliberation also 
gives a reviewing court the advantage of the executive’s fact-finding 
power in deciding whether an issue should be settled by the judici-
ary, or, contrarily, should be kept off the judicial agenda altogether. 
Or it can mitigate the Court’s agenda-limitation concerns, allowing 
the Court to send a question back to another branch when it wants to 
make sure—and make clear to the public—that the other branch 
really supports a particular outcome, much like Judge Calabresi’s 
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concept of the “constitutional remand.”291 These factors should not 
weigh in favor of exclusivity when cooperative techniques, such as a 
deliberation requirement, can handle them at least as well. 
 Finally, the Court will have to weigh whether to announce in ad-
vance that a particular point of doctrine is part of the indefeasible 
core of a constitutional right exclusive to the Court. Professor Mona-
ghan observes that clear demarcations between constitutional re-
quirements and defeasible “constitutional common law” invite more 
vigorous experimentation from Congress, which can feel more confi-
dent that its efforts will not be laid to waste by a later judicial deci-
sion.292 But it may be that the Court will want to be chary about what 
is or is not exclusive exactly in order to cut back on experiments that 
might wander close to the line. Thus, the decision whether to an-
nounce in advance will present a balance of values akin to the long-
standing trade-offs in avoidance generally: planning and certainty for 
the public versus defense of the underlying legal right. As with ques-
tions of avoidance, I suspect that decision will vary in each case.  
 But all of this is terribly abstract. Can it actually work in real 
controversies? In Parts VIII.A. and VIII.B., I try to show that it can. 
B.   Disparate Impact Regulations: An Example of Cooperation 
 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964293 makes it illegal for state 
actors intentionally and invidiously to discriminate based on race.294 
Title VI further authorizes federal agencies to enact regulations to 
ensure that state entities doing business with the federal govern-
ment do not discriminate.295 Many of these regulations additionally 
provide that those who receive federal funds from a given agency 
cannot enact or maintain policies having a “disparate impact” on ra-
cial minorities.296 The Supreme Court’s 2001 opinion in Alexander v. 
Sandoval, though, suggested strongly that these regulations might 
be invalid as beyond an agency’s power reasonably to interpret the 
mandate of Title VI,297 which resembles in form Congress’s power to 
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. I have argued elsewhere that 
this aspect of Sandoval is difficult to understand.298 The best expla-
nation seems to be that the Court read the scope of Congress’s dele-
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gation to the agencies narrowly in order to avoid the question 
whether the prohibition on disparate impact would be within Con-
gress’s Section 5 power.299 Thus, Sandoval is an application of the 
canon discussed throughout this Article—whether a court should as-
sume that an agency does not have the ability to interpret the Con-
stitution in parallel with the court. 
 As I have argued, rather than a blanket presumption against an 
agency’s power to interpret the Constitution, courts should instead 
attempt a nuanced balancing to determine whether judicial exclusiv-
ity in a particular case is actually necessary. Here, beginning with 
the values evident in the Court’s existing antidiscrimination deci-
sions, it seems fairly clear that exclusivity is inappropriate.  
 First, it is apparent that the Court does not see disparate impact 
discrimination as the central aspect of some right that it is the duty 
of the judiciary to protect. When faced with calls to defend minority 
plaintiffs against “unintentional,” unequal outcomes that seem to de-
pend in part on the plaintiffs’ race, the Court has deferred, citing in-
stitutional limitations that would make its protection less than fully 
effective.300 While the obligations of duty must to some extent be re-
sponsive to those concerns, the fact that the Court was willing to con-
front them in other areas, such as in many First Amendment 
cases,301 and not here suggests that disparate impact does not have 
the same appeal to the Court’s sense of core rights-protection obliga-
tions. Nor is the question of disparate impact quite so central to the 
fundamental definitions of equality and distributive justice the Four-
teenth Amendment demands as, say, intentional discrimination. To 
be sure, disparate impact could be framed as a question of equality—
equality of results rather than equality of treatment. But the Court 
seems to see it instead as more of a question of remedy for the core 
problems of intentional discrimination. In the Court’s view, prohibit-
ing disparate impact is a fallback method for preventing hidden or 
unconscious racism, or a tool for realigning the embedded social re-
sults of past deliberate inequities.302 That looks more like the sort of 
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policy question that principiled interpretation allows a court to share 
with other actors.  
 Most other factors also point against exclusivity. There is no 
strong interest in settlement. Indeed, the Court has expressly said 
that it wants to allow society to continue to evolve and develop before 
it establishes a lasting rule for how best to correct discrimination.303 
Furthermore, agency administration mitigates any agenda-limitation 
concerns the Court might have.  
 On the other hand, it is true that unintentional discrimination 
seems the sort of problem where the Court’s rhetorical and moral 
leadership could be especially powerful. Arguably, exclusivity would 
help the Court to command the rhetorical field, focusing more atten-
tion on its admonishments. But simply requiring agencies to examine 
facts and make findings on the scope of disparate impact discrimina-
tion in their field, as well as the appropriate remedies, could have the 
same benefit. That, too, would lead to public deliberation and would 
establish a set of conclusions from an entity with social prominence, 
with the added benefit that it would more directly involve the af-
fected stakeholders. The Court’s supervision of the process could 
make all the participants more principled and could lend the outcome 
some portion of the judicial reputation for moral leadership.  
 Therefore, contrary to the suggestion in Sandoval, disparate im-
pact regulations look like an area where exclusivity is not justified. 
That implies, in turn, that the Court should permit agencies to regu-
late disparate impact discrimination. As we just saw however, the 
Court might prudently demand that agencies deliberate regularly on 
how their various antidiscrimination policies actually function.  
C.   Tax Exemptions for Religious Organizations Acting Contrary to 
Public Policy: An Example of Exclusivity 
 For the most part, the federal government does not tax the income 
of religious organizations or other charities.304 One important excep-
tion to this general rule of exemption is that “an institution seeking 
tax-exempt status must serve a public purpose and not [act] contrary 
to established public policy.”305 Thus, some advocates of campaign fi-
nance reform have suggested that the IRS might use its powers to 
revoke and otherwise regulate the charitable tax-exempt status as a 
tool to discourage what these advocates see as behavior contrary to 
public policy, such as various forms of lobbying or other political ac-
tivity.306  
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 The IRS’s power to declare activities “contrary to established pub-
lic policy” may be constrained by the Supreme Court’s presumption 
against allowing agencies to consider constitutional questions. In Bob 
Jones University v. United States, the Court upheld the IRS’s deter-
mination that a pair of private religious schools were not entitled to 
exempt status because they discriminated on the basis of race.307 Sig-
nificantly, though, the Court warned that the IRS could make such a 
finding “only where there can be no doubt that the activity involved 
is contrary to a fundamental public policy.”308 In response to the peti-
tioners’ arguments that the IRS had not been delegated authority to 
make such a determination, the Court remarked that the IRS could 
properly find a charity contrary to fundamental public policy at least 
where “the position of all three branches of the Federal Government 
was unmistakably clear.”309 In answer to Justice Powell’s similar 
complaint, the Court responded, in effect, that the delegation to the 
IRS here was acceptable because Congress had clearly endorsed the 
delegation.310 In essence, the question was the same one as the one 
we have grappled with throughout this Article: can the IRS be pre-
sumed to wield power to make fundamental decisions of justice, espe-
cially those turning on interpretation of the Constitution, absent 
Congressional authority? The answer, it seemed, was no.311   
 My analysis thus far shows that the rule of Bob Jones University, 
read broadly in this way, is probably wrong. It should not be pre-
sumed generally that the IRS, absent a clear delegation, lacks au-
thority to contemplate constitutional questions. Nor should we uni-
versally limit the IRS’s understanding of those questions strictly to 
what courts have previously held.  
 At the same time, a more methodical analysis suggests that the 
Court was likely right that exclusivity is the right rule on the facts of 
Bob Jones University. We could begin, as some of the amici did, by 
framing the case as another application of the disparate impact regu-
lations question: shouldn’t the IRS have been free to take the view 
that its de facto support for a discriminatory institution infringed on 
equal protection values?312 But an important distinction between the 
Bob Jones University situation and disparate impact is that Bob 
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Jones University involved a direct conflict between two constitutional 
rights. At the tail end of its opinion, the Court also held that the gov-
ernment’s “overriding” interest in remedying discrimination out-
weighed the school’s asserted free exercise right to set admissions 
and interracial dating policies based on the religious convictions of 
its members.313 As a result, the IRS’s decision was not only a decision 
about equal protection, but also a decision about how to accommo-
date competing claims of racial justice and religious liberty (albeit 
liberty exercised in a rather loathsome fashion). The Court’s need to 
preserve for itself sole authority to resolve claims of competing rights 
seems one of the strongest justifications for exclusivity. 
 Furthermore, claims like those put forward by Bob Jones Univer-
sity seem, for this Court, to command a place closer to its notion of 
apolitical rights not to be shared with the other branches. It is true 
that, since the time of Bob Jones University, the Court has largely 
gotten out of the business of balancing religious liberty against the 
government’s interest in enforcing facially neutral laws of general 
application, and expressly relegated the complaints of those bur-
dened to the political process.314 But that is in part because the Court 
would like to distance religion from official government consideration 
of the importance of any particular religious obligation, especially 
since it is likely that the practices of unpopular or obscure religious 
organizations will be given scanter weight.315 The University’s claims 
also to the modern eye could have a strong Boy Scouts of America 
flavor of “intimate association” on top of the pure free exercise right 
it argued in 1983.316   
 Putting all these considerations together, I think the Court would 
probably (under this Article’s method) invoke exclusivity on a similar 
set of facts today. Unless the IRS’s reading of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was the same as the Court’s, it would be invalid, despite 
Congress’s authorization. It is not at all clear, though, that this same 
conclusion would apply to IRS regulation of the political activities of 
exempt entities.317 It would depend on how strong the entities’ free 
exercise and free association arguments were and how directly, if at 
all, they would conflict with whatever view of constitutionally-
inspired “public policy” the IRS offered. I leave that difficult question 
for future development.  
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IX.   CONCLUSION 
 Judicial exclusivity, I have argued, can coexist with cooperative 
constitutional interpretation between courts and the Executive. By 
invoking exclusivity selectively, the judiciary can protect its own in-
stitutional interests while at the same time garnering many of the 
benefits cooperation offers. It therefore would be a mistake for ad-
ministrative law to adopt a rule, as the tax law arguably has, that 
would presumptively reject independent executive interpretations of 
the Constitution as a legitimate basis for an agency’s decision. I have 
proposed instead a more nuanced balancing test, which courts could 
use to channel the competing considerations for and against exclusiv-
ity. I believe the test can offer powerful insights into a number of dif-
ficult dilemmas, as with its relatively easy resolution of the recently 
vexing question of the validity of disparate impact regulations.  
 At the same time, this Article is just a first step. I have suggested 
an answer only to the liminal question of whether an agency should 
have any independent interpretive authority. Once we agree that 
such authority sometimes exists, there is the secondary, and proba-
bly more important, question of how to review the resulting interpre-
tation. That debate has traditionally been framed as a matter of “def-
erence.” But as I have suggested here at times, there are many other 
factors at work besides simply the degree to which one institution 
should acknowledge the policy insights of another. When should judi-
cial interpretation happen? How can the judicial end of a shared in-
terpretation be structured to achieve judicial goals? What should 
judges say about deference in light of their self-perceived need to 
claim some ultimate authority?  
 My work here also suggests an interesting line of inquiry about the 
role of other interpreters. State governments sometimes defend state 
activity that infringes on one constitutional right by arguing that their 
action is necessary to preserve another constitutional right. Virginia, 
for example, barred funding for a religious publication at a public col-
lege on the ground that funding the organization would have been an 
establishment of religion.318 The State of Washington denied some 
scholarships to students pursuing a degree in theology for the same 
reason.319 In reality, resolution of both disputes might turn on the ex-
tent to which the state’s proffered constitutional justification is com-
pelling enough to survive First Amendment scrutiny, despite the fact 
that it might describe or view “establishment” differently than the Su-
preme Court would. Should the Court permit independent constitu-
tional interpretation by states, as well as by the Executive branch? 
Again, I leave that difficult question for future work. 
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